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defenses benefit or harm target corporations’ shareholders or society generally.
Much of the disagreement surrounding takeover defenses stems from the lack of
a fully developed formal analytical framework for considering their effects. Our
Article presents several formal models built upon a common core of assumptions
that together create such a theoretical framework. These models incorporate the
reality that target corporate insiders have superior information about the target
but are imperfect agents of its shareholders. They suggest that modern defenses
enable target shareholders to extract value from acquirers by empowering corporate insiders, but that takeover defenses do not benefit society as a whole. They
also help explain why corporations with different characteristics may choose to
adopt varying levels of takeover defenses. Our findings have implications for
the longstanding debate about who is best served by state-level control of corporate law and the desirability of increased federal involvement in corporate law.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate takeovers have occupied a prominent position in the
popular imagination, the financial press, and corporate law scholarship
1
for a generation. Yet despite all the thought and ink that have been
devoted to analyzing takeovers, many questions remain unsettled.
There is no consensus on the systemic effects of takeover defenses in
general, or of the most important defense mechanism—the shareholder rights plan or “poison pill”—in particular. Scholars disagree on
why different public firms exhibit varying levels of takeover defenses,
what causes these levels to change over time, and whether the interests
of shareholders or managers determine the level of takeover defenses
that a firm adopts. These unresolved questions have fueled the debate
about whether regulatory competition encourages states to enact socially optimal corporate laws, as well as the related issue of what role, if
any, the federal government should play in corporate law.
Much of the disagreement surrounding takeover defenses stems
from the lack of a fully developed formal analytical framework for considering their effects. Although a significant number of legal and economic academic papers have discussed takeover defenses from a theo2
3
retical perspective, very few have included formal models. Those that
1

Popular works about corporate takeovers abound. See, e.g., BRYAN BURROUGH &
JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO 477-505 (First Collins 2008) (1990) (providing an investigative account of the takeover of RJR Nabisco in
1988); WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987) (depicting the story of the fictional
corporate raider Gordon Gekko).
2
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1034-50 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-9 (1982); Mark Gordon, Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 819, 827-28 (2002); Lynn
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have proposed formal models have only focused on certain facets of
4
the takeover market, which has limited those models’ applicability.
Empirical investigations into the effects of takeover defenses on
firm performance have failed to resolve these debates. Given the lack
of theoretical guidance, it is not surprising that these investigations
5
have yielded little insight. Nonetheless, the sheer magnitude of variation in the empirical findings is shocking. As one commentator has
stated,
[S]tudies of [takeover defenses] have been remarkably unproductive
over the past twenty years. Not a single strong finding has been confirmed in other studies. Little or no consensus exists on why [takeover
defenses] are adopted or what effects they have. Given that as much academic energy has been poured into studying [takeover defenses] as into almost any other area of applied financial economics, the dearth of
6
results is astonishing, and itself in need of explanation.

This Article attempts to fill this gap in the dialogue by presenting
several formal models, built upon a common core of assumptions.
Taken together, these models create a theoretical framework for analyzing the effects of different levels of takeover defenses. They are the
first models of modern takeover defenses to incorporate the widely
accepted propositions that a target corporation’s managers and directors have the best information about the target and are unfaithful
agents of its shareholders.
These models yield many novel and important insights. They suggest that poison pills enable target shareholders to extract value from
A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845, 847-50 (2002).
3
Cf. Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J.
621, 622 (2003) (stating that the claim that defenses allow targets to extract higher
premiums from acquirers has “never [been] subjected to a careful theoretical analysis”).
4
See David Austen-Smith & Patricia C. O’Brien, Takeover Defences and Shareholder
Voting, 59 ECONOMICA 199, 202-08 (1992) (modeling defensive maneuvers that require
shareholder approval); Jeremy Bulow et al., Toeholds and Takeovers, 107 J. POL. ECON.
427, 432-38 (1999) (modeling the impact of a toehold—the interest a bidder acquires in
a target pre-takeover—on the behavior of the bidder and its competitors in a takeover
battle); Eitan Goldman & Jun Qian, Optimal Toeholds in Takeover Contests, 77 J. FIN.
ECON. 321, 327-33 (2005) (modeling a similar idea to explain that optimal toeholds
may be small percentage ownerships); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Greenmail,
White Knights, and Shareholders’ Interests, 17 RAND J. ECON. 293, 295-98 (1986) (modeling
the phenomenon of greenmail).
5
In Sections I.B and I.D, we provide an analytical framework suitable to guide
empirical investigations.
6
John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 317 (2000).
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acquirers by empowering corporate insiders. Even though these insiders are unfaithful agents of the shareholders, their superior information and higher reservation price can ultimately redound to the
shareholders’ benefit.
Our models also provide an explanation for the diverse levels of
takeover defenses that different public corporations exhibit. They
predict that the level of takeover defenses preferred by both shareholders and managers will vary depending upon several firm-specific
characteristics. These characteristics include the degree of uncertainty
about the value of the firm as a going concern, the potential synergy
gains that the firm offers potential acquirers, and the degree to which
the firm’s managers are faithful agents of the shareholders. Corporations for which an acquirer is likely to pay the highest premiums are
likely to elect higher levels of takeover defenses.
Unlike previous theories, our models predict that shareholders
will never choose the lowest possible level of takeover defenses and
that managers will not always choose the highest possible level.
Therefore, the diversity of defense levels that corporations adopt poses no challenge to theories that shareholders control choices of defense levels or to theories that managers control such choices. Further, the models suggest that, with respect to takeover defenses, the
interests of both shareholders and managers diverge from those of society. This highlights the fact that, even if regulatory competition creates a “race to the top,” it is a race with respect to shareholder interests and not with respect to those of society. These findings have
significant implications for the optimal scope of federal involvement
in corporate law. Our models also provide several testable hypotheses
to guide future empirical work.
This Article begins with a short overview of the conceptual framework of the public firm and modern takeover defenses. Part II then
presents and analyzes several formal game theoretic models, using repeated illustrative numerical examples. Part III discusses some additional implications of these models, compares their predictions to
what the existing body of empirical literature has documented, and
suggests further empirical work that could be done to test these models. We also include a mathematical appendix for more technically
inclined readers.
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I. BACKGROUND
Before presenting formal models, it is worth providing some background on how scholars conceptualize the modern public corporation,
as well as how the poison pill and the staggered board work in practice.
A. Conceptual Framework of the Public Firm
The chief lens through which corporate law views the corporation
envisions shareholders as principals and corporate managers as their
7
agents. Like most real-world agents, managers are not perfectly faithful to their principals. Their incentives are likely to diverge from
8
those of the shareholders and, when this happens, managers may be
9
expected to pursue their own interests at the shareholders’ expense.
10
These phenomena are known as “agency costs.”
A variety of market and legal mechanisms help discipline managers and reduce agency costs. The capital, product, and labor markets
11
all impose constraints on managers. Much of the law that governs
12
the structure of business associations is geared toward this concern.
For example, corporate law imposes a duty of loyalty on corporate
managers that prohibits them from self-dealing to the detriment of
13
the shareholders.

7

See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 26-27 (2002)
(providing background information about economic theories of the business firm).
8
Id. at 207.
9
See Jay C. Hartzell et al., What’s in It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV.
FIN. STUD. 37, 59 (2004) (providing evidence that target shareholders’ gains are smaller
when the merger gives the target CEO personal benefits); Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers
Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from “Mergers of Equals,” 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 60, 96
(2004) (finding that, in deals in which target CEOs obtain greater post-merger control
rights, target shareholders obtain a smaller proportion of joint gains); see also Thomas A.
Smith, The Passion of Professor Fischel: Defending Milken’s Financial Revolution, 22 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 1041, 1043 (1997) (book review) (describing how, before RJR Nabisco’s
well-known takeover, its CEO “was famous for squandering corporate cash on perquisites
for himself and his cronies” and “brought [in] celebrity athletes at great expense to play
golf and party with RJR executives”).
10
See, e.g., DONALD RUTHERFORD, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 10 (1992) (defining
the term “agency cost” as a “cost arising from a contractual relationship between a
principal and an agent”).
11
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 207.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 306-07.
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One of corporate law’s most important mechanisms for reducing
14
agency costs is the board of directors. The corporation’s shareholders elect its directors, who are legally obligated to monitor the manag15
ers and protect the shareholders’ interests. The law gives directors
vast power over the corporation, including the power to hire and fire
16
the corporation’s chief executive officer.
Yet despite the board’s great power, it is an imperfect monitoring
device. The board frequently includes members of management, or
17
“inside directors,” and the CEO often serves as its chairman. Nonmanager directors, also called “outside directors” or “independent directors,” may be dependent on the managers for information about
18
the company’s operations. In addition, the board is a body composed of agents, and is itself susceptible to agency costs.
Another important mechanism for constraining the behavior of
corporate managers is the threat of a corporate takeover. If a potential acquirer—be it a competitor, investment fund, or otherwise—
determines that a public corporation is being mismanaged, it may
19
seek to buy up that corporation’s stock from its current shareholders.
If successful, the buyer would be a majority shareholder and would
have the power to install a new board of directors, remove the existing
managers, and install new, better managers who would run the corpo14

See Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 SAN DIEL. REV. 781, 801-04 (2003) (“Boards of directors are intended to ensure that managers act in the interests of shareholders rather than in their own personal interests.”).
15
See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
16
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b) (2010); Dallas, supra note 14, at 801-04.
17
See Splitting Up the Roles of CEO and Chairman: Reform or Red Herring?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON ( June 2, 2004), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/createpdf.
cfm?articleid=987 (explaining that in 2004 the same person held the posts of both CEO
and chairperson at over seventy-five percent of S&P 500 companies).
18
Margaret McCabe & Margaret Nowak, The Independent Director on the Board of
Company Directors, 23 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 545, 555 (2008).
19
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control:
The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 6 (1983) (characterizing managerial competition as a way to limit divergence from policies that maximize shareholder wealth); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295,
296-97 (2003) (arguing that a takeover and subsequent reorganization can occur when
rational managers recognize inefficiency in other businesses); J. Wickramanayake &
Andrew Wood, Determinants of Acquisition Premiums: Empirical Evidence from Mining Industry in Australia and Canada 6 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.efmaefm.org/0efmameetings/efma%20annual%20meetings/2009-milan/412.pdf
(identifying the removal of inefficient management as a principal reason for takeovers).
But cf. Martin Bugeja & Terry Walter, An Empirical Analysis of Some Determinants of the Target
Shareholder Premium in Takeovers, ACCT. & FIN., Nov. 1995, at 33, 34-36, 56 (testing the
proposition that bad management drives takeovers but not finding support).
GO
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ration more efficiently. Equipped with better management, the new
corporation would be more valuable than the old corporation, which
20
would enable the acquirer to make a profit on the transaction. The
threat that the corporation will be acquired, and that the managers
21
will lose their jobs, encourages the managers to serve the sharehold22
ers’ interests. In essence, the existing managers of public corporations must compete against potential acquirers for the right to manage corporate resources; this concept is often referred to as “the
23
market for corporate control.”
Not surprisingly, shareholders and managers have very different attitudes toward the market for corporate control. Shareholders generally
want to make sure that a corporation is susceptible to a takeover. The
possibility of a takeover helps keep managers disciplined and, if a
takeover does occur, the shareholders will often receive a significant
24
premium. Managers, on the other hand, have almost diametrically
opposite incentives. They would prefer their behavior to be as unconstrained as possible and dislike takeovers because they often lose their
jobs or suffer other career setbacks when such transactions take
25
place. Accordingly, managers tend to be significantly more resistant
26
to takeovers than shareholders are.

20

See Marcia Millon Cornett et al., Performance Changes Around Bank Mergers: Revenue Enhancements Versus Cost Reductions, 38 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 1013, 1049
(2006) (finding that the “industry-adjusted operating performance of merged banks
increases significantly after a merger”); Jensen & Ruback, supra note 19, at 6, 8 (identifying utilization of better management as a source of takeover gains).
21
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Universal Banks Are Not the Answer to
America’s Corporate Governance “Problem”: A Look at Germany, Japan, and the U.S. (explaining
that middle managers are often laid off following mergers), in THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE FINANCE 552, 563 ( Joel M. Stern & Donald H. Chew, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 2003).
22
See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 19, at 29-30 (identifying the threat of a takeover
as an external control mechanism that incentivizes managers to serve shareholders’
interests).
23
Id. at 6.
24
See, e.g., B. Espen Eckbo, Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A Review, 15 J.
CORP. FIN. 149, 154-55 (2009) (finding that average offer premiums exceed forty percent of the target share price prior to a takeover bid’s announcement); Sara B. Moeller
et al., Firm Size and the Gains from Acquisitions, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 201, 220 (2004) (finding
that the average and median premiums paid for U.S. public acquisitions announced
between 1980 and 2001 were, respectively, sixty-eight and sixty-one percent for large
firms and sixty-two and fifty-two percent for small firms).
25
See Kenneth J. Martin & John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate
Takeovers and Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671, 672 (1991) (finding that “the turnover
rate for the top executive of target firms increases dramatically following successful tender offer-takeovers”); James P. Walsh, Top Management Turnover Following Mergers and Acquisitions, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 173, 179-80 (1988) (“Top management turnover rates
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Managers use a number of mechanisms to resist takeovers. These
27
mechanisms include blank-check preferred stock, share repurchase
28
programs, and corporate charter provisions that impose restrictions
29
on a majority shareholder. However, the most important modern
30
antitakeover device is the poison pill.
B. Poison Pills
31

The poison pill, formally known as a “shareholder rights plan,” was
invented in the 1980s by Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
32
Since the Delaware Supreme Court upheld their validity in
Katz.
33
34
1985, poison pills have become increasingly commonplace. As long
following a merger or acquisition are significantly higher than normal top management
turnover rates.”); see also supra note 21.
26
See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 563-64 (noting that managers have even
turned to state legislators to enact antitakeover statutes).
27
See Brent W. Ambrose & William L. Megginson, The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership Structure, and Takeover Defenses in Determining Acquisition Likelihood, 27 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 575, 584-85 (1992) (explaining that blank-check preferred
stock—i.e., stock whose terms the board can dictate and that it can issue without
shareholder approval—can be used to modify a firm’s capital structure to discourage a
takeover attempt).
28
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 692 (explaining that stock repurchase programs
involve buying target shares on the open market through a regular program and can
be used to resist takeovers); ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 922 (2010) (describing the antitakeover effects of repurchase programs).
29
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 677-79 (discussing supermajority vote requirements). By limiting the powers of a majority shareholder, these provisions make becoming a majority shareholder less desirable. Id.
30
See Coates, supra note 6, at 320-25 (arguing that most other takeover defenses
“have ceased to be of much importance” due to the rise of poison pills); Subramanian,
supra note 3, at 625 (“[T]he poison pill is by far the most important defense today.”);
cf. ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR., TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 7
n.23 (1981) (citing numerous sources that criticize the effectiveness of defensive charter provisions).
31
PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 28, at 919-20.
32
A Tough and Inventive Corporate Lawyer, WHARTON SCH. U. PA., http://www.
wharton.upenn.edu/125anniversaryissue/lipton.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
33
Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985).
34
Twenty-eight states have statutes explicitly authorizing poison pills. U.S. Proxy Voting Manual: Poison Pill Endorsements, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, http://
governanceanalytics.com/content/menutop/content/subscription/usvmfiles/x6383.html
(last visited Dec. 15, 2011). Others, like Delaware, have recognized them by judicial decision. See, e.g., Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357. Thousands of public corporations currently have
poison pills in effect. U.S. Proxy Voting Manual: Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans),
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, http://governanceanalytics.com/content/
menutop/content/subscription/usvmfiles/x6210.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
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as the jurisdiction in which the corporation is incorporated permits poison pills, a board of directors generally has the ability to enact a poison
35
36
pill quickly and easily. Since no state has outlawed poison pills, almost every U.S. public company essentially operates under a “shadow
37
poison pill” at all times, and so any would-be acquirers must act accordingly.
The key concept behind the poison pill is that it deters a potential
acquirer from purchasing the stock of the target by making a takeover
unprofitable. Poison pills generally come in one of two varieties: “flipin” and “flip-over.” They have similar effects and are often adopted in
38
tandem. When triggered, “flip-in” poison pills enable shareholders of
the target—other than the acquirer and its affiliates—to purchase ad39
ditional shares in the target for less than their actual value. By buying new target stock at a discount, the existing target shareholders severely dilute the value of the would-be acquirer’s ownership stake in
40
the target. These rights are usually triggered by the acquirer reaching a particular threshold of target stock ownership, commonly set be41
tween ten and twenty percent. “Flip-over” poison pills are similar to
“flip-in” poison pills, except that instead of enabling shareholders of
the target—again, not including the acquirer or its affiliates—to purchase target stock at below-market prices, they enable shareholders to
purchase stock in an acquiring company upon the merger of the tar42
get into the acquirer.
Thus, both poison pill varieties menace an acquirer with the pro43
spect of severely diluting its equity investment. Accordingly, acquir35

See Subramanian, supra note 3, at 625 (“Because a pill . . . is a dividend of rights
to purchase stock, and the board has the exclusive authority to issue dividends, a pill
can be adopted without a shareholder vote, in a matter of hours if necessary.” (footnote omitted)).
36
Id. But see id. (noting that flip-in poison pills are arguably not always valid in
California).
37
Coates, supra note 6, at 277.
38
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 683-84.
39
Id. at 684.
40
Id.
41
Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 904 (2002); accord Subramanian, supra
note 3, at 625.
42
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 681.
43
For example, suppose TargetCo stock is worth $10 per share with one million
shares outstanding, representing a total value of $10 million, and that the acquisition
of 10% of TargetCo’s outstanding shares triggers its poison pill. Assume the poison
pill allows each TargetCo shareholder—excluding the acquirer—to buy as many new
common shares as it currently owns for $2 per share. Buying 100,000 TargetCo shares
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ers are careful to avoid “swallowing” the poison pill—that is, acquiring
44
enough stock to trigger its dilutive provisions. In fact, bidders essen45
tially never trigger modern poison pills. As long as a poison pill remains in place, a takeover of the target corporation is effectively impossible.
Poison pills also include an additional feature: the target’s board
of directors may redeem (i.e., eliminate) a poison pill at little or no
46
cost. These redemption provisions enable the target’s board to clear
the way for acquisitions that it deems desirable and which the pill
47
would otherwise prevent. However, the redemption provisions require the board of directors to take affirmative action, and courts
generally give significant deference to a board’s decision not to re48
deem a poison pill. The poison pill therefore makes the board of directors the central focal point in a fight for control of the target.
Accordingly, when a target corporation has adopted a poison pill,
the acquirer will generally try to persuade the target’s board of direc-

will cost BuyerCo $1 million. At that point, the other shareholders will exercise their
rights and buy 900,000 new TargetCo shares for a total of $1.8 million. TargetCo
would then be worth $11.8 million ($10 million initially plus $1.8 million in new equity) and have 1.9 million outstanding shares. BuyerCo would own a 5.3% ownership
stake in TargetCo, worth about $625,000—far less than the $1 million BuyerCo paid.
44
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 680-85.
45
Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 904-05. A bidder once intentionally triggered
an early poison pill that only had negative effects if the acquirer attempted a freezeout
merger. Triggering it but not attempting a merger actually benefited the acquirer because it precluded the target from attracting a white knight (i.e., another bidder that
target management preferred to that acquirer). Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment
Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. L. 1, 1011 (2003). More recently, Trilogy intentionally triggered a poison pill put in place by
Selectica to protect its tax assets, apparently on the belief that the particular poison pill
at issue was illegal. See Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL
703062, at *2, *8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010) (explaining that Joseph Liemandt, the
founder of Trilogy and owner of eighty-six percent of its stock, triggered Selectica’s
poison pill to demonstrate the illegality of “adopting a pill with such a low trigger”);
Merle Erickson & Shane Heitzman, NOL Poison Pills: Selectica v. Versata, 127 TAX
NOTES 1369, 1369-70 (2010) (discussing Selectica’s attempt to protect its net operating
losses through the implementation of a poison pill).
46
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 684 (describing typical redemption provisions).
47
See id. at 682 (noting that this allows pills to block takeovers the board does not
like “while still allowing a friendly deal to be accomplished”).
48
See, e.g., Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 155455 (D. Del. 1995) (holding that a board’s good faith belief, based on reasonable investigation, that a takeover offer is not in the interests of the corporation is generally sufficient); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989)
(“[T]he refusal to entertain an offer may comport with a valid exercise of a board’s
business judgment.”).
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49

tors to redeem the pill. This may take the form of direct negotiations with the board itself, or negotiations with the target’s managers
50
in an attempt to win their support. If the acquirer succeeds, the
board redeems the poison pill and the acquirer proceeds with the
takeover. If the acquirer fails in this attempt, its next option is to try
to gain control of the target’s board at the ballot box by launching a
51
proxy fight in combination with a tender offer. If the proxy fight
succeeds, the shareholders elect a new board, which then redeems the
52
poison pill, clearing the way for the takeover.
Thus, while a board of directors has broad discretion to institute
53
and maintain a poison pill, the possibility of a shareholder revolt at
the ballot box creates a backstop to the directors’ potential abuse of
54
their power. This “ballot box safety valve” provides a mechanism with
which to overcome an entrenched board of directors that is not serving
55
the interests of the shareholders. In addition, the threat of a ballot
56
box revolt can increase a board’s willingness to redeem a poison pill.
In many cases, there are good reasons to expect the ballot box
safety valve to work reasonably well. By default, state law provides that a
corporation’s directors all sit for election at the corporation’s annual
57
shareholders’ meeting. Thus, an acquirer can capture control of the
board by winning a single proxy fight on a prescribed date, known in
advance, that is always less than a year away. In addition, depending on
a particular target’s bylaws, charter, and state of incorporation, the ac49

See G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?, 55 J. FIN.
2599, 2599-601 (2000) (discussing how deals may shift between friendly and hostile
postures).
50
Id. at 2600.
51
See Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 908 (“In the current legal regime, . . . if the
board wants to maintain the pill and not sell to a hostile bidder, the only way to gain
control passes through the ballot box.”).
52
Id. at 907-09. Some states allow pills that are especially difficult to remove,
which further delays this process. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-646(B) (2006) (allowing a board to limit certain parties’ ability to transfer or receive shares and to restrict
any accompanying rights they might have); see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 905
(noting the legalization of “no hand,” “dead hand,” and “slow hand” pills in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Georgia).
53
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
54
See Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 907 (explaining how the mere presence of
the ballot box safety valve encourages the board of directors to serve the shareholders’
interests).
55
Id. at 909.
56
See, e.g., id. (“[H]ow often managers will do the right thing will depend on the
consequences they face when they do not do the right thing.”).
57
Id. at 893.
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quirer may be able to act even more quickly, either by calling a special
shareholder meeting or by collecting written consents from the share58
holders to act in lieu of a meeting. Empirical evidence supports this,
suggesting that the presence of a poison pill either does not reduce the
59
likelihood of a takeover or only reduces it by a small amount.
C. Effective Staggered Boards
60

While the legal default rule is for directors to serve one-year terms,
states also allow an alternative known as a staggered or classified
61
board. The directors of a corporation with a staggered board serve
multi-year terms whose starting and ending dates are staggered relative
to each other, so that only a fraction of the directors sit for election
each year. The most common arrangement is for directors to serve
62
three-year terms, with one-third of directors being elected each year.
A staggered board interacts with a poison pill in an important way:
because the entire board does not sit for election each year, it becomes harder for an acquirer to gain control of the target’s board of
63
directors and remove its poison pill. This makes the ballot box safety
64
valve less accessible.

58

Id. at 910.
See Ambrose & Megginson, supra note 27, at 585, 587-88 (finding that “the existence of a poison pill defense is not associated with the probability of a takeover bid”);
William J. Carney & Leonard A. Silverstein, The Illusory Protections of the Poison Pill, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179, 182-83 (2003) (contending that poison pills are a mild takeover deterrent); Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on
the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 36-37
(1995) (finding “weak evidence” that poison pills effectively deter takeovers); Randall
A. Heron & Erik Lie, On the Use of Poison Pills and Defensive Payouts by Takeover Targets, 79
J. BUS. 1783, 1800 (2006) (concluding that “poison pills do not materially affect the
probability of takeover success”).
60
Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 893.
61
GRANT A. GARTMAN & JACK D. ISAACS, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR.,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STATE BY STATE: A GUIDE TO SELECTED STATUTES, at ii, app.
A-1 to -3 (1998); Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 893. States’ rules pertaining to staggered boards differ. For example, Delaware permits three classes of directors, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2010), but New York permits four, N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW
§ 704(a) (McKinney 2003). These differences are generally irrelevant for our purposes,
however, as they have not affected acquirers’ ability to take over targets without management approval. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 927-29 (finding no examples
from any state of ballot box victories against a target with an effective staggered board).
62
Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 893.
63
Id. at 902-09.
64
Id.
59
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Not all staggered boards present identical obstacles to would-be
acquirers. For example, some corporations allow the shareholders to
remove directors without cause at any time, giving the acquirer a
route to remove recalcitrant directors without waiting for their terms
65
to expire. In other instances, it may be possible for the acquirer to
“pack the board” by increasing the number of directors and filling the
66
newly created vacancies. In these instances, a staggered board and
poison pill combination imposes only a slightly larger hurdle for an
acquirer than a poison pill alone.
A staggered board that a would-be acquirer cannot easily eliminate or circumvent is known as an “effective staggered board” or
67
“ESB.” Professor Lucian Bebchuk and others have found that the
presence of an effective staggered board has dramatic implications for
the availability of the ballot box safety valve. They concluded that the
ballot box was a viable mechanism for an acquirer to pursue an acqui68
sition when the target did not have an effective staggered board, but
that it was completely foreclosed when the target had an effective
69
staggered board. They were unable to identify a single instance in
which an acquirer successfully used the ballot box to gain control of a
70
target corporation with an effective staggered board.
D. Takeover Defenses in the Academic Literature
There has been a spirited debate in the academic literature over
the societal merits of takeover defenses in general and poison pills in
particular. Some commentators have decried modern defenses, arguing that they serve only to benefit managers by deterring takeovers,
71
thereby impeding the market for corporate control.

65

Id. at 909-13.
Id. at 910.
67
Id. at 894.
68
Id. at 929.
69
Id. at 927-29.
70
Id. at 928-29.
71
See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 168-74 (1991); Harry DeAngelo & Edward M. Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 329, 335 (1983); Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1174-80 (1981); Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and
the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 229, 229-51 (1986); see also Robert Daines &
Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs,
17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 83 (2001) (“Takeover defenses are commonly thought . . . to
be motivated by management’s interest in entrenching itself.”).
66
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Supporters have countered that poison pills do provide a benefit
by giving the target’s board of directors time to put the target up for
auction. Since the highest value-added acquirer—that is, the acquirer
that would gain the most synergy from the acquisition—will be willing
to pay the highest price, supporters reason that such an auction allows
72
the most efficient user of the target’s assets to purchase the target.
Detractors have responded with two arguments: First, federal reg73
ulations on tender offers are already sufficient to create auctions. Second, and more fundamentally, acquirers generally initiate corporate
74
acquisitions, and they face significant search and transaction costs.
Forcing acquirers to compete in an auction for the target will diminish
their gains from takeovers. Thus, acquirers will have reduced incentives to search for targets and engage in takeovers, which will lead to
75
fewer takeovers. Detractors argue that it would be preferable to simply have acquirers purchase targets with low premiums and, if necessary,
to have repeated sales of the target until its assets end up in the hands
76
of the highest-value-added acquirers. This is an essentially empirical
question, the answer to which remains unresolved.
Takeover defenses also feature prominently in the long-running
debate about how state-level control has affected the evolution of corporate law. Some have argued that states compete for corporate charters, as they provide a state with a source of revenue and income for
77
that state’s lawyers.
72

See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 1048; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23, 39 (1982);
Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35
STAN. L. REV. 51, 62 (1982); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 848-55 (1981) [hereinafter Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations].
73
Cf. Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 27, 27 n.1 (1991) (discussing the Williams Act).
74
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 1178-79; Schwartz, supra note 71, at 23334.
75
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 1189-90; Schwartz, supra note 71, at 237.
76
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 14-15. Part of this argument is that various target corporation assets are likely to have different highest value-added users. Id.
77
See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6-8
(1993) (discussing state competition and finding that on average from 1960 to 1990
over fifteen percent of Delaware’s tax revenue came from incorporation fees); William
L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 668
(1974) (explaining that Delaware’s corporate law, in addition to raising revenue for
the state, creates business for the bar that amounts to a “vested interest”); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 727 (1987)
(commenting that the “only groups who are active in the enactment of second generation takeover statutes are business organizations and the bar”); Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
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Among those who subscribe to this view, one school of thought
argues that shareholders choose the state in which a corporation will
incorporate. Accordingly, states compete to provide the best legal regime for shareholders. This leads to a “race to the top” in which, over
78
time, states choose corporate laws that maximize social welfare.
Another school of thought reasons that it is managers, not shareholders, who choose the state of incorporation. This school argues
that managers prefer laws that best enable them to extract benefits
from their offices, generally at the expense of the shareholders. This
leads states to compete in crafting the worst corporate laws, creating a
79
“race to the bottom.”
State laws affecting the market for corporate control have been
central to this debate because they are thought to be an area in which
shareholders’ and managers’ interests are directly opposed. As noted
previously, shareholders tend to favor takeovers while managers do
80
not. While the race to the bottom argument has largely been reject81
ed, some studies have shown that states that offer higher levels of

State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 255
(1977) (noting that the purpose of state corporate code provisions has been to produce
tax revenues and that, in Delaware, corporate lawyers have benefited).
78
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 71, at 212-27 (arguing that in theory a
“race for the bottom” cannot exist and that competition, if not necessarily driving laws
“to the top,” does drive them up and thus benefits investors); ROMANO, supra note 77,
at 148-49 (finding that state competition is the “genius of American corporate law” in
that it makes states “sensitive to investor concerns,” thereby fueling a “race . . . for the
top and not the bottom in the production of corporate laws”); Peter Dodd & Richard
Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: “Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259, 260-61 (1980) (explaining that “investors weigh the costs and benefits of alternative state corporation codes when they consider investments in securities
of firms incorporated in particular states” and finding that shareholders benefit even
when management chooses the state of incorporation).
79
See Cary, supra note 77, at 670-85 (contending that Delaware has created a corporate legal climate favorable to management through legislative enactments and judicial rulings and claiming that Delaware is “in the lead” in the “race for the bottom”);
see also Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545,
555-57 (1984) (arguing that corporate law favors management over shareholder interests and that reforms are unlikely because managers will “flee” to other states).
80
See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
81
See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 14-15 (stating that empirical research does
not support the race to the bottom view); ROMANO, supra note 77, at 14-15 (explaining
how the consensus on the race to the bottom changed following Ralph Winter’s 1977
article challenging this view (citing Winter, supra note 77, at 289-92)); Romano, supra
note 77, at 711-12 (maintaining that criticism of race to the bottom explanations has
been “devastating” because “managers are compelled, by natural selection, to seek the
state whose laws are more favorable to shareholders”).
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82

protection against takeovers are better able to attract incorporations.
Thus, commentators still debate whether this phenomenon applies to
83
state laws governing takeovers and takeover defenses.
Yet both the race to the top and race to the bottom theories must
be reconciled with the significantly varied levels of takeover defenses
84
that different corporations utilize. Presumably, if managers disfavor
takeovers, they would choose the highest possible level of defenses.
Similarly, if shareholders favor takeovers, they might be expected to
choose the lowest possible level of defenses. Shareholders may prefer a
somewhat higher level of defenses if it increases their (or their agents’)
85
leverage in negotiations with acquirers, but it is unclear why this would
produce the diversity of defense levels that corporations exhibit.
82

See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46
J.L. & ECON. 383, 421 (2003) (finding that states with numerous antitakeover statutes
are “more successful in the incorporation market—both in retaining in-state firms and
in attracting out-of-state incorporations”); see also Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of
Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover
Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1801, 1840 (2002) (finding that a company
headquartered in a state with control-share acquisition, business-combination, and pillvalidation statutes is twenty-six percent “more likely to be incorporated in that state
than a company headquartered in a state without any of these statutes”).
83
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 82, at 404-11 (arguing that “[o]ne of the
most important and hotly debated subjects in corporate law has been the regulation of
hostile takeovers” and outlining the positions in the debate regarding antitakeover
protections); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 703-04 (2002) (“Whether modern antitakeover statutes have
the effect of attracting incorporations is empirically disputed.”); Romano, supra note
77, at 725-31 (“The impact of takeover statutes remains . . . a troubling open question.”); Subramanian, supra note 82, at 1840-41, 1852-53 (finding that managers migrate to states with antitakeover statutes, which supports a race to the bottom, but also
that managers do not migrate toward, and may migrate away from, those states with
the strongest takeover laws).
84
See Coates, supra note 6, at 324 fig.1 (showing the diversity of defense levels
among a sample of two thousand large public firms and that in 1996, for example, approximately four hundred and fifty firms had staggered boards, three hundred had
fair price provisions, and one hundred required a supermajority vote to approve a
merger); Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 85 (finding that half their sample of
firms going public had the strongest level of protection and roughly two-thirds had
significant defenses); Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 763 (2003) (“Between 1987
and 1999, approximately 6000 firms went public, and roughly half had staggered
boards.” (footnote omitted)); Seoungpil Ahn et al., The Differential Effects of Classified Boards on Firm Value 1 ( J uly 17, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265078 (“[O]ver 60% of large publicly traded U.S. firms
currently maintain classified boards and . . . this proportion has remained fairly stable
over the last decade.”).
85
Cf. Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 98-99 (discussing the bargaining power
hypothesis, which states that antitakeover provisions “can increase share value by en-
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Many empirical studies have attempted to explain these patterns by
86
looking for traits common to firms that have adopted poison pills or
87
other antitakeover devices. Unfortunately, the results of these studies
vary widely. For example, studies do not agree on whether companies
88
that adopt poison pills tend to be above- or below-average performers.

hancing the bargaining power of the firm’s management when a bid is made, thereby
enabling management to extract a higher price from a bidder”).
86
Studies have looked at factors such as firm size, board composition, and stock
ownership, among other factors. See, e.g., Jamil Aboumeri, Poison Pills and Shareholder
Value, 1992-96, ASPEN LAW & BUS. CORP., Dec. 15, 1997; James A. Brickley et al., Outside
Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 388-89 (1994); Comment &
Schwert, supra note 59, at 23; Gerald F. Davis, Agents Without Principles? The Spread of the
Poison Pill Through the Intercorporate Network, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 583, 603-06 (1991); Gerald F. Davis & Henrich R. Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the
1980s, 103 AM. J. SOC. 1, 21-26 (1997); Richard J. Dowen et al., Poison Pills and Corporate
Governance, 4 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1994); Rakesh Duggal & James A. Millar,
Institutional Investors, Antitakeover Defenses and Success of Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 Q. REV.
ECON. & FIN. 387, 399 (1994); Charmen Loh, The Influence of Outside Directors on the
Adoption of Poison Pills, Q.J. BUS. & ECON., Winter 1994, at 3, 10; Paul H. Malatesta &
Ralph A. Walkling, Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth, Profitability, and Ownership
Structure, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 347, 374 (1988); Paul Mallette & Karen L. Fowler, Effects of
Board Composition and Stock Ownership on the Adoption of “Poison Pills,” 35 ACAD. MGMT. J.
1010, 1028-31 (1992); Michael Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder
Wealth, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 377, 387-88 (1988); John S. Strong & John R. Meyer, An Analysis of Shareholder Rights Plans, 11 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 73, 75-78 (1990);
Chamu Sundaramurthy, Corporate Governance Within the Context of Antitakeover Provisions,
17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 377, 387-88 (1996); cf. Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance, 53 J. FIN. 605, 617 (1998) (finding that firms with poison pills or other takeover deterrents were neither more nor less attractive to activist
block share purchasers than firms without such defenses).
87
See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Gershon N. Mandelker, Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 25 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 143, 145 (1990); Sanjai Bhagat & Richard H. Jefferis, Voting Power in the
Proxy Process: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 30 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 195, 219
(1991); Kenneth A. Borokhovich et al., CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52
J. FIN. 1495, 1503 (1997); Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Shark Repellents and
Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 127, 155
(1987); Victoria B. McWilliams, Are Antitakeover Charter Amendments Good News or Bad
News for Managers and Shareholders?, J. APPLIED BUS. RES., Spring 1994, at 82, 86.
88
Compare Malatesta & Walkling, supra note 86, at 350, 372 (finding that firms
adopting pills had lower profitability ratios, but not operating margins, in the year preceding pill adoption), and Strong & Meyer, supra note 86, at 76 (finding that pilladopting firms had lower price-to-earnings ratios, higher extraordinary items, and
higher tax loss carryforwards), with John M. Bizjak & Christopher J. Marquette, Are
Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind
Poison Pills, 33 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 499, 518-19 (1998) (finding no significant relationship between pill adoption and pre- or post-adoption stock returns), Davis
& Greve, supra note 86, at 23-25 (finding no significant relationship between market-tobook ratio and pill adoption), Dowen et al., supra note 86, at 311 (same), and Mallette
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Studies even disagree on the seemingly straightforward question of
89
whether larger or smaller firms are more likely to adopt poison pills.
As Professor John Coates has noted, these inconsistent results may
stem from the fact that these studies generally do not consider the
90
looming presence of a “shadow pill.” Because almost all firms can
easily adopt a poison pill if a bidder appears, there is arguably no substantive difference between firms with poison pills and those without;
91
for most firms, adopting a poison pill merely sends a signal. This
methodological concern potentially calls into question many poison
92
pill studies.
Similarly, studies that focus on other takeover defenses often fail
93
to fully account for the presence of a shadow poison pill, which ren94
ders many other defenses superfluous. For example, if an acquirer
who gains control of the target’s board can remove a defense, it adds
little additional protection beyond what the shadow poison pill al95
ready confers. More generally, studies often fail to account for inter96
actions between defenses.
More recent empirical studies have responded to these methodo97
logical critiques by focusing on takeover defenses at the IPO stage.
& Fowler, supra note 86, at 1025-27 (finding that firms adopting poison pills did not
have lower returns on equity prior to pill adoption).
89
Some studies have found that larger firms are more likely to adopt pill defenses.
See, e.g., Aboumeri, supra note 86; Comment & Schwert, supra note 59, at 25. Other
studies have reached the opposite conclusion; that is, that smaller firms are more likely
to adopt poison pills. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 86, at 608; Mallette & Fowler, supra
note 86, at 1027. In contrast to these two groups of studies, some studies have found
that firm size has no effect on the likelihood of pill adoption. See, e.g., Malatesta &
Walkling, supra note 86, at 370 n.22; Sundaramurthy, supra note 86, at 388 tbl.4.
90
Coates, supra note 6, at 286-91.
91
Id. at 297-99.
92
See id. at 286-91 (arguing that “pill event studies suffer from a serious design
flaw” in that they fail to take into account the effects of shadow pills).
93
See id. at 320-25 (claiming that studies focusing on supermajority requirements
and fair price provisions “are no longer relevant . . . in the era of the shadow pill”).
94
See id. at 325 (noting the rarity with which fair price and supermajority charter
amendments have been proposed and contending that “they have ceased to be of
much importance in the shadow of the pill”).
95
See id. at 325-28 (asserting, for example, that “[w]ithout the pill, the presence or
absence of a classified board is largely irrelevant”).
96
Id.
97
See, e.g., Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 85 (examining charters at the IPO
stage to “avoid[] the selection bias and mixed signals that are present in studies of
[takeover defenses] that already public firms adopt by charter amendment”); Klausner, supra note 84, at 763 (attempting to explain firms’ silence on takeover-friendly
charter provisions at the IPO stage); Arno Forst et al., Insider Entrenchment and CEO
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One study by Professors Robert Daines and Michael Klausner considered the level of takeover defenses in the charters and bylaws of 310
newly public firms and tested several possible explanations for the ob98
served variation. Daines and Klausner did not find evidence that the
interests of a firm’s shareholders determined its level of takeover defenses, but they did find that defenses were not correlated with indica99
tors of managerial rent-seeking. Another study by Klausner focused
on newly public firms with private equity and leveraged-buyout firm investors and found that many potential rationales previously proposed
to explain varied takeover defense levels—such as inducing founders
to sell additional shares, preserving efficient private benefits, pre-IPO
agency costs, and facilitating team production processes—did not fit
100
the data. An empirical study by Professor Seoungpil Ahn and others
found that certain firms—those with greater advisory needs and whose
managers are easier to monitor—may benefit from having staggered
101
boards, while other firms may not. While this study potentially offers
insight into why different levels of defenses are optimal for different
firms, it does not explain how a firm actually chooses its level of defenses and, like previous works, it is in tension with both shareholder
102
Thus, none of these empirical
primacy and managerialist theories.
studies suggests an explanation for the observed diversity of defense
levels among public firms.
Compensation: Evidence from Initial Public Offering Firms 28-30 (Oct. 11, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (finding that entrenchment decisions
at the IPO stage heavily influence post-IPO CEO compensation).
98
See Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 85, 110-13 (considering, among others,
the “bargaining power, rational myopia, [and] private benefits hypotheses”).
99
Id. at 110-11.
100
Klausner, supra note 84, at 775-84; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms
Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 723-28 (2003) (arguing that
conflicting evidence on midstream and IPO behaviors cannot be easily explained by
existing theories); Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 689703 (2003) (arguing that classical theories of agency cost-reduction cannot comfortably explain empirical evidence as it relates to the directors of public firms and how
they carry out their responsibilities).
101
Ahn et al., supra note 84, at 8.
102
If shareholders’ interests determine a corporation’s level of takeover defenses,
one would not expect to see firms with staggered boards that are not benefitted by
them. If managers determine a corporation’s defense level, there should be some reason why they prefer having staggered boards in some cases but not in others. Ahn and
others suggest staggered boards are likely to increase firm value when board stability
signifies board independence and careful scrutiny of management, as opposed to rentseeking by insiders. Id. at 30. However, it would seem that management would prefer
not to have a staggered board in such instances.
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As mentioned, while numerous papers have broadly analyzed cor103
porate takeovers and defenses from a theoretical perspective, most
104
have not included formal mathematical models. Most formal models of takeover defenses have restricted themselves to narrower aspects
105
of the takeover market.
For example, Professors Andrei Shleifer
and Robert Vishny presented a model demonstrating how antitakeo106
Their model also
ver maneuvers may maximize shareholder value.
illustrates that negative share-price reactions associated with such maneuvers may be attributable to new information that the maneuvers
107
reveal about the target, rather than the maneuvers themselves.
108
However, their model, designed to analyze greenmail, only applies
109
to “action[s] that effectively eliminate[] a potential acquirer.” Thus,
it is not directly translatable to the larger context of takeover defenses,
110
such as poison pills, which do not have this effect. Professors David
Austen-Smith and Patricia O’Brien presented a model that explains
why shareholders may sometimes vote in favor of antitakeover provi111
However, a corporation’s board of
sions that decrease firm value.
directors is generally free to adopt a poison pill without any action by
shareholders, thus limiting this model’s applicability to the modern
112
takeover market.
More recently, Professor Guhan Subramanian constructed a model of takeover defenses using the analytic framework of negotiation
113
theory. He then used this model to illustrate how previous theoretical discussions’ failure to account for real-world phenomena led them
103

See sources cited supra note 2.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
105
See sources cited supra note 4.
106
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 4, at 297-308.
107
Id.
108
Greenmail generally refers to a target corporation buying back a potential acquirer’s shares at a premium in exchange for the potential acquirer agreeing not to
own any target shares for a period of time. See id. at 293 (defining greenmail and describing it as one of the “most prominent example[s] of a managerial action commonly believed to be in conflict with shareholders’ interest”).
109
Id. at 294.
110
See sources cited supra note 59.
111
See Austen-Smith & O’Brien, supra note 4, at 212-13 (arguing that, given certain
signaling effects and other actors’ responses to their actions, shareholders may be
choosing the “lesser of two declines in value”).
112
See Coates, supra note 6, at 286-87 (demonstrating the ease with which “large,
sophisticated targets” can quickly adopt a poison pill).
113
See Subramanian, supra note 3, at 640-44 (applying a Nash bargaining game to
explain takeover behavior). For an explanation of a Nash bargaining game, see John
F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 157-59 (1950).
104

BARRY & HATFIELD REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

654

2/15/2012 7:17 PM

[Vol. 160: 633
114

to overstate the value of defenses to target shareholders.
Subramanian posits that, at best, an acquirer has all of the negotiating leverage
when there are no defenses, while strong defenses place both parties
115
on even footing. He argues that, in practice, other factors are likely
to constrain outcomes, such as other options available to acquirers or
116
targets (e.g., selling to or buying another firm), the costs of a hostile
117
118
bid, and managerial unfaithfulness. Subramanian also recognizes
that target managers often have private information regarding the
true value of the firm and argues that this militates in favor of friendly
119
deals, further reducing the value of defenses.
In summary, no formal theoretical model has yet been proposed
that explains either the observed variation in firms’ defense levels or
120
how firms choose those levels.
This Article attempts to fill both of
these gaps by offering a theoretical exploration of the effects of modern takeover defenses that can provide insights into the complicated
empirical evidence on these defenses. Our models consider managers’
informational advantage in more depth and show how this informational asymmetry may cause defenses to benefit target shareholders,
121
Our models predict
even though managers are unfaithful agents.
that poison pills increase target shareholder returns and that, in some
cases (but not all), the presence of an effective staggered board further
122
Our models thus offer an explanation for
increases those returns.
the diverse defense levels that corporations exhibit and shed further
light on the debate over the nature of regulatory competition.

114

Subramanian, supra note 3, at 644-48, 665-66.
Id. at 655-59.
116
Id. at 644-50.
117
See id. at 650-59 (arguing that hostile bids affect bidder out-of-pocket costs,
bidder reputational costs, target costs, and defense-dependent costs).
118
See id. at 662-65 (explaining how corporate insiders might use leverage created
by defenses to extract value for themselves instead of for shareholders).
119
Id. at 659-62.
120
But see John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the
Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1383-86 (2001) (“[V]ariation in legal takeover defense
vulnerability at the IPO stage is explained in large part by variation in the quality of
legal advice provided to pre-IPO owner-managers.”); Ahn et al., supra note 84, at 36
(arguing that firms with low monitoring costs and high advisory needs often benefit
from staggered boards).
121
See infra Section II.C.
122
See infra Part III.
115
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II. THE MODELS
This Article models three different antitakeover regimes. Each is
123
a multi-period model built around a core of shared assumptions
about (1) the target corporation (the “Target”) and (2) the incentives
of, and the information available to, the Target’s shareholders (the
“Shareholders”), its managers and board of directors (the managers
124
and the board of directors, collectively, the “Insiders” ), and the
would-be acquirer of the Target (the “Acquirer”). Section II.A presents this common core.
This joint framework is then used to model three separate antitakeover regimes for the Target. Each regime changes the dynamic in
which the Acquirer’s bid is considered, and each provides a different
level of protection against takeovers. In increasing order of protection, the three regimes are: (1) the Target has no poison pill, (2) the
Target has a poison pill but it does not have an effective staggered
board, and (3) the Target has both a poison pill and an effective staggered board.
For ease of analysis, regime (1) is modeled in Section II.B (the
“No Poison Pill” model), regime (3) is modeled in Section II.C (the
“Poison Pill with ESB” model), and regime (2) is modeled last, in Section II.D (the “Poison Pill Without ESB” model). Section II.E then
uses the results of the previous Sections’ analyses to build two integrated models: the “Managerialist” model, in which the Insiders
choose the Target’s level of antitakeover defenses, and the “Shareholder Primacy” model, in which the Shareholders choose. We proceed to consider the predictions of these two integrated models in
light of observed real-world behavior and the welfare implications of
the various antitakeover regimes.
A. Common Framework: Players and Incentives
This Article’s models begin with the Target, the Shareholders, and
the Insiders. The Target has an overall value, v (the “Actual Target
Value”). This amount reflects the Target’s assets and liabilities, ex123

A multi-period model is a model with more than one time period. See DREW
FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 70-72 (1991) (providing a mathematical
and conceptual definition of a “multi-stage game” and equating “stages” of the game to
time periods).
124
While managers and board members are grouped together as “Insiders,” these
groups are not interchangeable and do not have the same incentives. See infra Section
II.A.
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125

pected future earnings, and other sources of value. In the first period of each model, the Shareholders and the rest of the public at large
do not observe v directly. Instead, they know that v is within a range
of possible values; the lower bound of this distribution is vmin (the
“Minimum Target Value”) and the upper bound is vmax (the “Maxi126
The models analyzed in this Article assume
mum Target Value”).
that v is uniformly distributed over this interval; in other words, v is
equally likely to be any value in this range. Accordingly, the public es127
timates the Target’s value to be the midpoint of this range (v̄). This
value—the public’s expectation with respect to the Actual Target Value, not the Actual Target Value itself—is reflected in the market price
128
of the Target’s stock (the “Initial Trading Price”).
Consider a fictional company, “AcmeCo.” Assume AcmeCo has
129
assets worth between $250 and $750.
For example, AcmeCo might
be a coal mining company with $250 of known and proven coal reserves, with additional reserves that have not been fully surveyed but
which may be worth as much as $500, or a pharmaceutical company
with approved drugs worth $250 and additional products under development that could be worth up to $500 in aggregate. The Minimum Target Value would thus be $250, and the Maximum Target
Value would be $750. The Initial Trading Price would be $500, the
midpoint between these two values as well as the expected value of
130
This Article will refer to this “AcAcmeCo’s Actual Target Value.
meCo Example” at several points to illustrate other concepts.
131
In reality, firm values are unlikely to be uniformly distributed,
132
but, as shown in the Appendix, all of the conceptual results present125

The models assume that v ≥ 0.
It follows from the assumption v ≥ 0 that vmin ≥ 0 and vmax ≥ 0.
127
See DAVID R. ANDERSON ET AL., STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 229
(rev. 10th ed. 2009) (stating that the expected value of a uniform continuous probability distribution is the midpoint between the smallest and largest values that the random
variable may assume).
128
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 551 (1984) (“Despite certain anomalies, numerous studies demonstrate that the capital market responds efficiently to an extraordinary variety of information.” (footnote omitted)).
129
All dollar amounts in the examples are in millions.
130
Again, the Initial Trading Price and the expected value of AcmeCo’s Actual
Target Value are the same because the Actual Target Value is assumed to be uniformly
distributed over this interval.
131
A more common assumption among sophisticated mathematical analyses is
that stock prices are distributed lognormally. See, e.g., Fischer Black & Myron Scholes,
The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 640 (1973) (assuming that stock prices follow a “random walk,” and, thus, that the “distribution of possi126
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ed here hold true when firm values follow any given distribution. We
assume a uniform distribution within the main text of this Article to
capture the point that valuation is uncertain and to simplify the mathematical analysis, which makes it easier to understand what is happening on a conceptual level. Part III considers the implications of using
133
a more realistic probability distribution.
The models assume that the Insiders, by virtue of their positions,
have private information about the Target in the first period. In the
case of the coal company referenced above, this could mean knowledge
of preliminary and unreleased surveys of the unexplored reserves or, in
the case of the pharmaceutical company, preliminary results from clinical trials. In other scenarios, this information could include knowledge
of research and development projects, contract negotiations, or internal strife at the company. This assumption—that Insiders often have
private information that gives them insight into a firm’s value that the
public does not have—is a basic tenet underlying insider-trading en134
forcement policy, and some suggest that it is a primary assumption
135
underlying Delaware corporate jurisprudence.
Accordingly, our models assume that the Insiders’ private information about the Target gives them exact knowledge of the Actual
Target Value. So, continuing with our AcmeCo Example, while the
public knows only that AcmeCo is worth between $250 and $750, the
Insiders know its exact value. While this assumption is unlikely to be
true in reality, the Insiders, of all the parties involved, are likely to
have the best information about the Target’s value, which is the key
insight that the models must capture. The models would work similarly as long as the Insiders have the best information about the Tar-

ble stock prices at the end of any finite interval is lognormal”); Mark Rubinstein, The
Valuation of Uncertain Income Streams and the Pricing of Options, 7 BELL J. ECON. 407, 41720 (1976) (deriving the Black-Scholes formula while assuming stock price variables
were lognormal); Michael J. Sharpe, Lognormal Model for Stock Prices 2 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://math.ucsd.edu/~msharpe/stockgrowth.pdf
(assuming, for calculation purposes, that the set of stock prices is lognormal).
132
The Appendix does not assume a uniform distribution.
133
See infra subsection III.B.3.
134
PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 28, at 833.
135
See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain
Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 521-22 (2002) (arguing that Delaware
takeover cases reflect the “hidden value” model “in which a firm’s true economic value
is visible to well-informed corporate directors but not to the company’s shareholders
or to potential acquirers”); see also Subramanian, supra note 3, at 659-62 (adopting a
framework resembling the “hidden value” model).
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136

get’s value. Assuming that the Insiders’ information is exactly accurate is a simplifying assumption that makes the models more tractable
and helps to highlight the intuitions underlying them. Part III exam137
ines the consequences of relaxing this assumption.
There are a number of processes by which private information is
138
disseminated into the markets over time.
For example, companies
139
file new financial statements, they introduce (or do not introduce)
new products, articles appear in the financial press, and so forth. The
multi-period models presented in this Article incorporate this feature
of real-world markets by having the value of the Target be revealed to
all parties in a subsequent time period, after the Target is either acquired or remains independent.
The final player is the Acquirer, who makes a cash offer to pur140
chase the Target. The total amount of this offer is referred to as the
141
“Price,” p. The Acquirer is interested in buying the Target because
142
some sort of profit will result (the “Synergy”), denoted by s.
136

It is also important that the Acquirer does not have information about the Target’s value as a stand-alone firm that the Insiders lack. For more on such doublesignaling games, see generally Lawrence M. Ausubel et al., Bargaining with Incomplete
Information, in 3 HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 1897
(Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart eds., 2002).
137
See infra subsection III.B.2.
138
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 128, at 592-609 (discussing in depth the
structure of the information market and its effect on overall market efficiency).
139
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006) (requiring that issuers of securities file certain documents with the Securities and Exchange Commission); Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 128, at 635 n.225 (summarizing the major requirements under section 13 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
140
In reality, acquirers offer cash, securities, or a combination. Each option has
potential costs and benefits. Compare Walter J. Mayer & M. Mark Walker, An Empirical
Analysis of the Choice of Payment Method in Corporate Acquisitions During 1980 to 1990, Q.J.
BUS. & ECON., Summer 1996, at 48, 48; Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate
Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have,
13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 188 (1984); and Wickramanayake & Wood, supra note 19, at 7 (all
suggesting targets prefer cash offers for simplicity or signaling reasons), with David T.
Brown & Michael D. Ryngaert, The Mode of Acquisition in Takeovers: Taxes and Asymmetric
Information, 46 J. FIN. 653, 667 (1991); Dan S. Dhaliwal et al., The Effect of Seller Income
Taxes on Acquisition Price: Evidence from Purchases of Taxable and Tax-Exempt Hospitals, J.
AM. TAX’N ASS’N, Fall 2004, at 1, 19; Merle Erickson, The Effect of Taxes on the Structure of
Corporate Acquisitions, 36 J. ACCT. RES. 279, 296 (1998); and James W. Wansley et al., Abnormal Returns to Acquired Firms by Type of Acquisition and Method of Payment, FIN. MGMT.,
Autumn 1983, at 16, 16 (all suggesting targets prefer stock offers because of their superior tax treatment). For simplicity, our analysis is restricted to all-cash offers, but stock offers are functionally identical unless taxes are considered, the use of stock conveys new
information about the Acquirer, or the Shareholders cannot sell the stock upon receipt.
141
In reality, the Price offered would commonly take the form of a price per share
of Target stock. However, the two are generally mathematically equivalent, and con-
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The models assume that the Synergy constitutes a social gain, and
143
not merely a distributive gain to the Acquirer. While one might believe, a priori, that acquirers gain utility from takeovers at the expense
of other parties—such as creditors, workers, customers (in the form of
market power), or the government (in the form of tax savings)—
empirical studies have generally found that these factors do not ade144
Even if some takeover gains to the
quately explain takeover gains.
Acquirer are merely distributive, it suffices for our purposes that there
be some net social gain (i.e., that distributive effects are not the sole
145
source of gains).
The Synergy may stem from efficiencies created by the Acquirer
combining its own business with the Target’s, by the Acquirer running
the Target’s business more profitably, or some combination of the
two. For instance, the Synergy could be created by economies of
146
147
scale, network effects, or by virtue of the Acquirer and Target besidering the purchase price as a lump sum makes the analysis easier to describe. This
Article therefore adopts this convention.
142
The models assume s > 0.
143
This assumption is irrelevant for the analysis in Sections III.B-D, but is important to the welfare analysis of subsection III.E.3.
144
See, e.g., Erik Devos et al., How Do Mergers Create Value? A Comparison of Taxes,
Market Power, and Efficiency Improvements as Explanations for Synergies, 22 REV. FIN. STUD.
1179, 1194, 1207-08 (2009) (finding that market power does not explain gains, tax reduction explains a small fraction of gains, and most gains are caused by synergy); C.
Edward Fee & Shawn Thomas, Sources of Gains in Horizontal Mergers: Evidence from Customer, Supplier, and Rival Firms, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 423, 458 (2004) (finding evidence of
improved efficiency but not of gains from monopoly power); Joel F. Houston et al.,
Where Do Merger Gains Come From? Bank Mergers from the Perspective of Insiders and Outsiders, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 315-18, 327 (2001) (finding that cost savings, not market power, explain takeover gains in bank mergers); Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 49, 56-58
(concluding that most takeover gains do not come from losses by labor, creditors, or
tax revenues, but rather from “beneficial reshufflings of productive assets”); Jensen &
Ruback, supra note 19, at 9 (suggesting that market power does not explain takeover
gains). But see Brian E. Becker, Union Rents as a Source of Takeover Gains Among Target
Shareholders, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 18 (1995) (finding that losses to labor
caused some takeover gains).
145
See infra subsection II.E.3. It is worth noting that the definition of Synergy only
includes those social gains that accrue to the Acquirer, which may undervalue total social gains from an acquisition.
146
See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 380-86 (8th ed. 2010) (discussing economies of scale).
147
See, e.g., Jan K. Brueckner & Pablo T. Spiller, Competition and Mergers in Airline
Networks, 9 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 323, 331 (1991) (describing the operation of network
effects in the airline industry); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 772-73 (1995) (discussing network effects in corporate law).
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148

ing monopolists of complementary products.
Continuing with our
AcmeCo coal mining example, the Acquirer might be a mining company with a neighboring mine. By combining AcmeCo’s and the Acquirer’s separate mines into a single, unified operation, they might be
able to mine coal more efficiently, rendering the whole more valuable
149
than the sum of its parts. For example, if the mines were worth $200
more together than apart, the Synergy would be $200.
The models assume that both the Shareholders and the Acquirer
150
are risk neutral and only concerned with their monetary returns.
Thus, their only goal is to maximize the expected value of their profits.
First, consider the incentives facing the Acquirer. If the Acquirer does
not purchase the Target, its situation is unchanged; its utility is zero. If
the Acquirer successfully acquires the Target, it receives (1) the Actual
Target Value, since it now owns the Target, plus (2) the Synergy created
by the acquisition, minus (3) the Price that it paid to acquire the Target. Mathematically, this corresponds to v + s – p. Equivalently, the Acquirer’s utility is the sum of the Synergy (s) and the difference between
the Actual Target Value (v) and the Price that the Acquirer pays for the
151
Target (p). The difference between v and p will be negative if the Actual Target Value is less than the Price the Acquirer pays.
Returning to the AcmeCo Example, if BuyerCo offers to purchase
AcmeCo for a Price of $550, and that offer is accepted, BuyerCo’s utility would be the Actual Target Value (which may be anywhere between $250 and $750), plus the $200 Synergy, minus the $550 Price
that the Acquirer paid for the Target. Thus, depending on the Actual
152
Target Value, the Acquirer’s utility could range from -$100 to $400.
The Shareholders’ outcomes are the mirror images of the Acquirer’s. If the Acquirer does not purchase the Target, the Shareholders’

148

See, e.g., Jordan Barry, When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’s Poor Secondary
Incentives Through an Optional Patent Purchase System, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 585, 601-02 (explaining how monopolists of complementary products create more inefficiencies than
a single monopolist would).
149
See, e.g., Arch Coal Completes Acquisition of Jacobs Ranch, YOUR MINING NEWS (Oct.
2, 2009), http://www.yourminingnews.com/news_item.php?newsID=39494 (explaining
that the acquirer’s CEO predicted “substantial operational and financial synergies”
from integrating adjoining mines).
150
Risk-neutral actors are concerned only with their expected returns and not the
returns’ variability.
151
This follows because mathematically v + s – p = s + (v – p).
152
The Acquirer’s utility is v + s – p = v – 350. Because 250 < v < 750, it follows that
-100 < the Acquirer’s utility < 400.
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153

utility is the Actual Target Value (v).
But if the Acquirer does purchase the Target, the Acquirer pays, and the Shareholders receive, the
Price (p). So, continuing the previous paragraph’s example, assume
BuyerCo offers to acquire AcmeCo at a Price of $550. The Shareholders then evaluate whether $550 is more or less than they think AcmeCo
is worth. If they conclude that $550 is more than AcmeCo’s Actual Tar154
get Value, they will agree to the sale and receive $550 worth of utility.
If they conclude that $550 is less than AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value,
they will not sell and will receive utility equal to the Actual Target Value,
which could be anywhere between $250 and $750—the Minimum Target Value and the Maximum Target Value, respectively.
Thus, when considering a takeover offer, the Shareholders are only concerned with two things: the Price the Acquirer offers and what
they believe the Actual Target Value to be. Put another way, the
Shareholders will accept any offered Price (p) that is higher than they
expect the Actual Target Value (v) to be. Similarly, they will reject
any offered Price (p) that is lower than they expect the Actual Target
155
Value (v) to be.
The Insiders differ from the Shareholders and the Acquirer in two
distinct ways. First, by virtue of their positions, they have private information about the Actual Target Value. Thus, while the Acquirer
calibrates its offer, and the Shareholders evaluate that offer, against
what they believe the Actual Target Value to be, the Insiders directly
measure the offer against the Actual Target Value.
Second, the Insiders have different incentives than the Shareholders and the Acquirer do. The Insiders are agents of the Share156
holders and usually own Target shares. Thus, they have some incentive to encourage a deal if the Acquirer offers a purchase price that is
higher than the Actual Target Value and to resist a deal if the reverse
is true. But, at the same time, they are not perfect agents of the
Shareholders, and they also receive utility by virtue of their employ-

153

To simplify the analysis, the models treat the Shareholders as a monolithic
whole with a shared joint utility, akin to producer or consumer surplus. Subsection
III.B.5 discusses the likely consequences of relaxing this assumption.
154
For technical reasons, the Appendix assumes that the Shareholders accept an
offer when they are indifferent between accepting and rejecting. See infra Appendix
A.1, Proposition 1.
155
In other words, the Shareholders will accept the Acquirer’s offer to buy the
Target for p if, and only if, the Shareholders believe that p ≥ v.
156
See supra Section II.A.
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157

ment at the Target.
If the Target is sold, the Insiders are likely to
158
lose their jobs and any concomitant perquisites.
Therefore, they
generally will not be as willing to sell the Target as the Shareholders
159
will be. Put another way, the reservation price of Shareholders with
perfect information about the Actual Target Value—that is, the lowest
Price that such Shareholders would accept for the Target—is less than
160
The difference between these two
the Insiders’ reservation price.
161
reservation prices is the Insiders’ “Private Benefits,” b.
Therefore,
the Insiders’ utility is either (1) the Actual Target Value (v) if the Target remains independent or (2) p – b, the difference between the
Price (p) and their Private Benefits (b), if the Acquirer purchases the
162
Target.
Conceptually, Private Benefits (b) measure the degree to which
the Insiders are unfaithful agents of the Shareholders; the larger that
b is, the less faithful they are. If the Insiders were perfectly faithful,
and only cared about the Shareholders’ returns, Private Benefits (b)
would be zero, and the Insiders would make the same decision as perfectly informed Shareholders. If the Insiders cared only about keeping their jobs and not at all about the Shareholders’ returns, then no
offer from the Acquirer, no matter how high, would induce them to
sell, and Private Benefits (b) would be infinite.
For simplicity, the models assume that the amount of Private Bene163
fits (b) is publicly known. This assumption is almost certainly false in
reality, but it is adopted to simplify the analysis and make the models
164
more transparent. In reality, Private Benefits are likely to depend, in
part, on a number of observable factors, including the corporation’s
157

See Subramanian, supra note 3, at 663 (recognizing the divergent interests of
shareholders and target employees).
158
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
159
The reservation price is the “minimum price a seller will accept” in auctions
and the “maximum [price] a buyer will offer.” RUTHERFORD, supra note 10, at 393.
160
Cf. Peter H. Eddey & Roger S. Casey, Directors’ Recommendations in Response to
Takeover Bids: Do They Act in Their Own Interests?, 14 AUSTL. J. MGMT. 1, 26 (1989) (finding that initial bids rejected by management are significantly lower than subsequent
bids that they accept).
161
The models assume 0 ≤ b ≤ ∞.
162
Like the other actors, the Insiders are assumed to be risk neutral.
163
In game theory terminology, b is “common knowledge.” See FUDENBERG &
TIROLE, supra note 123, at 541 (“An event is common knowledge if players know this
event, know that other players know this event, and so on ad infinitum.”); see also
Subramanian, supra note 3, at 643 (assuming common knowledge in his models).
164
See infra subsection III.B.2 for a discussion of the likely implications of relaxing
this assumption.
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governance provisions, the presence of activist shareholders, wheth167
er the company is managed by family founders, the board’s degree of
168
169
independence, the amount of stock that the managers own, and the
170
size of the Insiders’ golden parachutes. In addition, the Shareholders
and potential acquirers may be able to make inferences about the magnitude of the Insiders’ Private Benefits by evaluating how the Insiders
reacted to previous takeover attempts. For example, if the Insiders were
receptive to a prior takeover attempt, but it failed for regulatory rea171
sons, that would suggest that the Insiders’ Private Benefits are lower.
Thus, while the value of Insiders’ Private Benefits (b) is unlikely to be
known exactly, it is likely that the Target’s Shareholders and potential
acquirers would have some insight into how faithful the Target’s management is to shareholder interests.
With this framework of assumptions in place about the actors, their
incentives, and their levels of knowledge, we can now consider the various takeover defense regimes within which they interact. We begin by
considering the scenario in which the Target has no poison pill (the
“No Poison Pill” model) in Section II.B. We then consider the scenarios in which the Target has a poison pill but does or does not have an
effective staggered board in Sections II.C (the “Poison Pill with ESB”
model) and II.D (the “Poison Pill Without ESB” model), respectively.
165

For example, an independent board of directors would be expected to reduce
entrenchment and rent-seeking. Dallas, supra note 14, at 801-04.
166
See Alon Brav et al., The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–
Dec. 2008, at 45, 47-54 (describing how activist shareholders can lead to better corporate governance and increased firm value).
167
See Robert Zafft, When Corporate Governance Is a Family Affair, OECD OBSERVER,
Oct. 2002, at 18, 18-19 (noting that family-run firms do not generally focus on principles of good corporate governance).
168
Dallas, supra note 14, at 801-04. In this context, independence refers to the
percentage of outside directors on the board and the board’s willingness to exercise
independent judgment, challenge the managers’ assertions, and accept a takeover offer the managers disfavor. The degree to which these factors are observable varies.
169
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 198; see also Hartzell et al., supra note 9, at 57-58
tbl.7 (finding evidence that takeover resistance does not benefit target shareholders
when the target CEO owns little target stock).
170
Golden parachutes are contractual provisions that provide for large payments
in the event of a takeover and certain other circumstances. They potentially allow the
Shareholders to affect the Insiders’ Private Benefits directly. If the payouts were sufficiently large, the Insiders would have negative private benefits (i.e., they would be willing to sell for a lower price than fully informed shareholders would accept). In practice, this seems to happen rarely, if ever.
171
See, e.g., John M. Broder, F.T.C. Rejects Deal to Join Two Giants of Office Supplies,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1997, at 1 (describing the federal government’s rejection on antitrust grounds of a proposed merger of Staples and Office Depot).
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B. The No Poison Pill Model
This antitakeover regime is the simplest. It reflects a basic tender
offer scenario in which the Acquirer makes an offer to the Sharehold172
ers, who either accept or reject it.
The Insiders have essentially no
role in the process. Figure 2.1 depicts this process as an extensive
173
form game.
Figure 2.1
Acquirer Makes
Offer, p

Shareholders
Accept

Shareholders
Reject

This scenario is very simple to analyze. The Shareholders, for
their part, believe that the Target is worth the Initial Trading Price
(v̄). The Acquirer’s optimal strategy is to offer to buy the Target at a
174
Price (p) that is slightly higher than the Initial Trading Price (v̄).
The Shareholders accept this offer, because the Acquirer’s offered
Price (p) is slightly more than their estimate (v̄) of the Actual Target
175
Value. The Acquirer’s utility varies depending on the Actual Target
Value (v), but its expected utility is the Synergy created by the acquisition (s) minus the amount that the Price (p) exceeds the Initial Trading Price (v̄). Since the Acquirer offers a Price (p) that is only slightly
higher than the Initial Trading Price (v̄), the Acquirer’s expected utility will approximately equal the Synergy (s).
Returning to our AcmeCo Example, in which AcmeCo’s Initial
Trading Price (v̄) is $500, BuyerCo might offer a Price of $510. The
Shareholders would accept this offer, as doing so would make them
$10 better off than they would otherwise expect to be.

172

Cf. Subramanian, supra note 3, at 642-43 (adopting a similar assumption).
A game is in extensive form when represented as a multi-player decision tree
that shows when each player acts and what each player knows when it acts. FUDENBERG
& TIROLE, supra note 123, at 67, 77-82.
174
See infra Appendix A.1, Proposition 1; see also Subramanian, supra note 3, at 643
(providing a numerical example for a similar situation).
175
Technically, the equilibrium Price is exactly (v̄). See infra Appendix A.1, Proposition 1.
173
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For its part, BuyerCo would own AcmeCo, which has an expected
value of $500, and gain an additional $200 in Synergy. In exchange,
BuyerCo would pay $510 to the Shareholders, leaving it with an expected net utility of $500 + $200 – $510 = $190. BuyerCo’s actual net
utility could be as low as -$60 or as high as $440, depending on AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value. But since BuyerCo is assumed to be risk
neutral, calculating its expected utility ($190) is sufficient.
In the No Poison Pill model, the Acquirer always acquires the
Target. This leaves the Shareholders better off than they would have
been without a sale, but only slightly. The Acquirer, by contrast, does
significantly better, as it keeps the lion’s share of the Synergy created
by the purchase.
The essential intuition behind this model is that the Insiders are
not a factor. The Acquirer deals directly with the Shareholders, and
the two parties have similar information sets. The market sets the value of the Target, and the Acquirer pays a slight premium. This facilitates acquisitions, but does not provide the Shareholders with large
premiums, both of which benefit the Acquirer. In modern times, attempts to take over publicly traded U.S. firms that lack poison pills are
rare, because nearly all U.S. public firms operate with shadow poison
176
pills at all times.
C. The Poison Pill with an Effective Staggered Board Model
In this model, the Acquirer makes an offer to the Insiders, who either accept or reject it. This formulation represents the empirical reality, discussed in Section I.C, that it is prohibitively difficult to take
over a target corporation against the wishes of recalcitrant manage177
ment if the target has a poison pill and an effective staggered board.
Since the effective staggered board gives the Insiders the power to
make or prevent a deal, they determine whether to accept the Acquirer’s offer; the Shareholders are essentially nonparticipants. Figure 2.2
depicts the entire process as an extensive form game.

176

See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
See Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 904-05 (concluding that poison pill defenses
are for all practical purposes impregnable so long as incumbent insiders retain board
control).
177
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Figure 2.2
Acquirer Makes
Offer, p

Insiders
Accept

Insiders
Reject

The interaction between the Acquirer and the Insiders differs
from the dynamic between the Acquirer and the Shareholders discussed in Section II.B. Because of their private information, the Insiders evaluate the Acquirer’s offer against the Actual Target Value,
not against the Initial Trading Price. This informational asymmetry
178
creates what is known as an “adverse selection” problem.
The concept of adverse selection describes circumstances in which
one party to a transaction cannot directly observe the quality of an
item at issue, while its counterparty can. It was first recognized in the
context of insurance markets, which remain the canonical exam179
ples.
Consider a company that sells insurance policies against bicycle theft. Suppose potential purchasers of insurance know whether
they face higher- or lower-than-average risks of theft (they know
whether they keep their bike in a garage or on the street, the quality
of their bicycle lock, etc.), but that the insurance company does not,
180
and must charge all individuals the same amount for insurance.
Thus, the cost of insurance is the same for all purchasers, but the expected benefit increases with an individual’s risk. Consequently, the
higher an individual’s risk level, the more likely she will be to pur181
chase insurance. This means that policyholders will not be a representative cross section of the target population; there will be a higher
proportion of high-risk individuals and a lower proportion of low-risk
178

RUTHERFORD, supra note 10, at 7.
See VARIAN, supra note 146, at 722-23 (describing the phenomenon); see also
Barry, supra note 148, at 629 (discussing a potential adverse-selection problem in the
context of a proposed government program for disseminating intellectual property).
180
VARIAN, supra note 146, at 723; see also George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 491-93, 499-500
(1970) (setting out the theory of adverse selection and mechanisms to counter the resulting potential market failure).
181
VARIAN, supra note 146, at 723.
179
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individuals. From the insurance company’s perspective, this is an ad182
verse selection.
The interaction between the Acquirer and the Insiders is similar
to the interaction between the insurance company and its potential
customers. The Acquirer does not know whether the Actual Target
Value is higher or lower than the Initial Trading Price. On the other
hand, the Insiders know the Actual Target Value, and will only accept
an offer if the Price is at least that amount. This selects for instances
183
in which the Actual Target Value is relatively low. Thus, targets that
are successfully purchased will not be a representative cross section of
targets, but instead those that are worth less than expected—from the
acquirer’s perspective, an adverse selection of targets.
This effect is exacerbated by the Insiders’ Private Benefits; the Insiders will not only require that the Acquirer offer a Price (p) that
equals or exceeds the Actual Target Value (v), but will instead require
the Acquirer to offer a Price (p) that equals or exceeds the sum of the
184
Actual Target Value (v) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b).
This adverse-selection problem significantly disadvantages the Acquirer. If the Acquirer succeeds in purchasing the Target, it will always pay more for the Target than it is worth. The larger the Insiders’
Private Benefits, and the more uncertain the Acquirer is about the Actual Target Value (i.e., the larger the difference between the Maximum Target Value and the Minimum Target Value), the worse the
Acquirer’s position becomes. The one factor working in the Acquirer’s favor is that it stands to benefit from Synergies that make the Target uniquely valuable to it. Thus, the Acquirer can pay a Price that is
higher than the Actual Target Value and still be better off than if it
185
had not bid for the Target.
182

Id.
If the Acquirer’s offer is high enough, the Insiders will always accept it, and
purchased Targets will be a representative cross section. Similarly, if the Acquirer’s
offer is low enough, the Insiders will always reject it. But within this range of values,
there will be adverse selection.
184
The Insiders’ decision rule follows from their utility function. They receive
utility of p – b from a sale of the Target; if there is no sale, they retain v. Thus, they favor a sale if and only if p – b ≥ v. We assume that, when indifferent, the Insiders accept
the Acquirer’s offer. See infra Appendix A.1, Proposition 1.
185
It can be a bit confusing to talk about the Target’s “Actual Target Value,” as the
Target is of particular value to the Acquirer, who is willing to pay an amount that exceeds
the market price because, unlike other market actors, the Acquirer stands to receive synergistic benefits. See Nikhil P. Varaiya, Determinants of Premiums in Acquisition Transactions,
8 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 175, 176 (1987) (considering synergies as a reason for
acquisition premiums); see also Dean Crawford & Thomas A. Lechner, Takeover Premiums
183
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Some numerical examples help clarify these points. Consider
again the AcmeCo Example discussed earlier, and assume that the Insiders have Private Benefits (b) of $100. Suppose BuyerCo offers a
Price of $600, the sum of the Initial Trading Price ($500) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits ($100). AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value may be
anywhere from $250 to $750. The Insiders will only accept BuyerCo’s
offer if the Actual Target Value is $500 or less; otherwise, BuyerCo’s
offered price will be less than the sum of the Actual Target Value and
the Insiders’ Private Benefits. Accordingly, in those instances in which
the Insiders accept BuyerCo’s offer, AcmeCo’s expected Actual Target
Value will not be $500 (its expected Actual Target Value in general),
but $375 (its expected Actual Target Value given a range of potential
Actual Target Values between $250 and $500). BuyerCo can anticipate this adverse selection; combined with the $200 in Synergy that
BuyerCo will gain, BuyerCo’s expected utility from owning AcmeCo
will be $575. This amount is less than the $600 Price that BuyerCo
would pay. Consequently, at this price, BuyerCo would be better off
not attempting to buy AcmeCo.
If, instead, BuyerCo were to offer a Price of $500, the Insiders
would only accept the offer if AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value were
186
Compared to the prior example, the Insiders would
$400 or less.
accept BuyerCo’s offer less frequently (30% of the time instead of
187
50% of the time ), and in those instances in which BuyerCo successfully acquires AcmeCo, AcmeCo’s expected Actual Target Value
188
However, BuyerCo’s lower
would be lower ($325 instead of $375).
bid compresses the range of possible Actual Target Values for which it
successfully acquires AcmeCo relative to the prior example. Reducing
this uncertainty lessens BuyerCo’s bargaining disadvantage against the
Insiders. In the instances in which BuyerCo successfully acquires AcmeCo, its expected utility from owning AcmeCo would be $525 (a
and Anticipated Merger Gains in the US Market for Corporate Control, 23 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT.
807, 809 (1996) (noting that a bidder’s offer price is a function of both the underlying
value of the target and the bidder’s potential gains from a takeover); Wickramanayake &
Wood, supra note 19, at 5 (same). It might be more precise, but less intuitive, to say the
Acquirer can pay more for the Target than its stand-alone value.
186
Again, this example assumes that Private Benefits are $100. $500 – $100 =
$400.
187
If the Actual Target Value is drawn from a uniform distribution with a minimum of $250 and a maximum of $750, the Actual Target Value will be less than or
equal to $500 fifty percent of the time and less than or equal to $400 thirty percent of
the time.
188
Given that the Actual Target Value is less than or equal to $400, the expected
Actual Target Value would be ½($250 + $400) = $325.
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$325 expected Actual Target Value plus a $200 Synergy). In exchange
189
for this benefit, BuyerCo would pay $500.
Thus, unlike the last example, BuyerCo is better off than if it had not bid.
If the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b) are larger than the Synergy (s),
it is impossible for the Acquirer and the Insiders to strike a mutually
190
beneficial deal.
To illustrate this, return to the AcmeCo Example,
but assume that the Private Benefits (b) are $300 instead of $100. The
Insiders would only agree to sell if BuyerCo offers a Price that is $300
more than the Actual Target Value. Because of the Synergy that the
acquisition creates, BuyerCo’s utility from the acquisition would be
$200 more than AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value, but less than the additional $300 that BuyerCo would have to pay to overcome the Insiders’
Private Benefits. Thus, BuyerCo would be better off not bidding for
AcmeCo than making any bid that the Insiders might accept.
Assuming that the Synergy (s) is larger than the Insiders’ Private
191
Benefits (b), it is always possible for the Acquirer to make an offer that
192
will make it better off and that the Insiders may be willing to accept.
193
The next question is what offer is optimal for the Acquirer to make.
It is helpful to first establish upper and lower bounds on the range
of potential offers that must be analyzed. The upper bound on this
range is the sum of the Maximum Target Value (vmax, which is $750 in
our recurring AcmeCo Example) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits
(b). Since, by definition, the Actual Target Value cannot exceed the
Maximum Target Value, such an offer would have to be at least as
much as the sum of the Actual Target Value and the Insiders’ Private
Benefits. Thus, offering that Price guarantees the Acquirer that it will
acquire the Target; bidding more would merely mean overpaying and
194
lowering the Acquirer’s net utility. Simply put, such an offer would
already be too good for the Insiders to refuse.

189

In those scenarios in which the Insiders reject BuyerCo’s offer, BuyerCo receives zero utility, which is what it would have received if it had not bid at all.
190
See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 4.
191
Subsequent analysis in Section II.C assumes this to be the case unless explicitly
stated otherwise.
192
The Insiders will sometimes accept an offer that falls between the sum of the
Minimum Target Value and the Private Benefits and the sum of the Minimum Target
Value and the Synergy. When they do, the Acquirer will receive positive utility.
193
See infra Appendix A.2, Propositions 2-6, for a formal derivation of the Acquirer’s optimal offer price.
194
The Acquirer’s net utility is the difference between the value of what the Acquirer receives and the Price it pays; increasing the Price decreases this amount.

BARRY & HATFIELD REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

670

2/15/2012 7:17 PM

[Vol. 160: 633

On the other hand, the Insiders will reject any offer that is less
than the sum of the Actual Target Value and the Insiders’ Private
Benefits. The Actual Target Value will always exceed the Minimum
195
Target Value. Thus, if the Acquirer offers a Price that is less than or
equal to the sum of the Minimum Target Value (vmin) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b), its offer will always be refused.
The utility that the Acquirer receives from offering a given Price
(p) between these upper and lower bounds depends on the Actual
Target Value: if the Price (p) is greater than or equal to the sum of
the Actual Target Value (v) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b), the
Insiders will accept the Acquirer’s offer and sell the Target. In that
case, the Acquirer’s net utility will be the value of what it receives (v +
s, the sum of the Actual Target Value and the Synergy) minus the
Price (p) that it pays. Otherwise, the Insiders will reject the Acquirer’s
offer, and there will be no transaction. The Acquirer will neither pay
anything nor take ownership of the Target, and its net utility will
therefore be zero.
Consider how the Acquirer’s utility changes when it increases the
Price that it offers by a small amount, y (i.e., it increases the Price
from p to p + y). In all of the instances in which the Insiders would
have accepted a Price of p, the Acquirer becomes worse off; in both
scenarios, it purchases the Target, but in the second scenario, the Acquirer pays a higher price. In all of the instances in which the Insiders
reject the Acquirer’s new offer, they would also reject the Acquirer’s
original, slightly lower offer. Therefore, the Acquirer’s relative position in these instances is unchanged. Lastly, there are some instances
in which the Insiders would reject the original offer, but will accept
the new, higher offer. In these instances, the Acquirer is better off.
Figure 2.3, below, illustrates these effects.

195

Assuming the Actual Target Value (v) follows a uniform distribution, the probability that the Target is worth exactly the Minimum Target Value is essentially nil.
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 229.
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Figure 2.3: Effect of Offering a Price Increase of y on the
196
Acquirer’s Utility as a Function of Target Value, v
Acquirer’s Utility
s–b
Utility lost
by Acquirer
Utility gained
by Acquirer

vvmin
min

p

p–b

p–b+y

vmax

Firm Value

The amount that the Acquirer expects to lose from raising its
Price when its original Price would have been sufficient appears as the
lighter shaded region, a parallelogram, with height y and width (p – b)
– vmin. At the lower bound of the range of possible Prices (p), this parallelogram has no width and the Acquirer’s expected loss from a price
increase is zero. As the offered Price (p) increases, so do the Acquirer’s expected losses from a further increase.
The amount that the Acquirer expects to gain from those instances in which the higher Price would entice the Insiders to sell, but the
original Price would not, appears as the darker shaded region. This
region is trapezoidal, as shown in Figure 2.3. But, for small increases
in price, it is effectively a rectangle, with base y and height (s – b).
These expected gains do not change with the original Price.
The optimal Price for the Acquirer to offer is the smaller of (1) the
Price at which the expected costs from increasing the Price equal the
expected gains from doing so, and (2) the upper bound on the range
of potential offers, (vmax + b) (an “Upper-Bound Offer”).
The first offer corresponds to the Price (p) at which the darker and
197
lighter shaded regions in Figure 2.3 have the same area. Mathematically, for small values of y, this essentially means that y(p – b – vmin) = y(s
196

Figure 2.3 assumes vmin + b < p < vmax + b.
This is true because of the assumption that the Actual Target Value follows a
uniform distribution. The same principle holds for other distributions, but the math is
more complicated because different possible valuations have different probabilities.
See infra Appendix A.2, Propositions 2, 6.
197
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198

– b). This is true when p = vmin + s (i.e., when the Price is the sum of
199
the Minimum Target Value and the Synergy).
In such a scenario,
there will be cases—those instances in which the Actual Target Value is
high—in which the Insiders will reject the Acquirer’s offer. Thus, the
200
Acquirer will purchase the Target sometimes, but not always.
For example, assume again that AcmeCo is worth between $250 and
$750, and is estimated to be worth $500. Assume further that the Synergy is $300 and the Insiders’ Private Benefits are $100. It is optimal for
BuyerCo to offer a Price of $550 ($250 + $300). The Insiders will only
accept this offer if AcmeCo’s actual value is $450 or less, which will only
201
be the case 40% of the time. The other 60% of the time, the Insiders
will reject BuyerCo’s offer and AcmeCo will not be acquired.
As the Synergy (s) increases and all other variables remain con202
stant, the Acquirer’s optimal offer increases correspondingly, as
does the probability that the Acquirer successfully purchases the Target. If the Synergy is sufficiently large, the sum of the Minimum Target Value (vmin) and the Synergy (s) will exceed the upper bound on
the offer range established previously. In such a case, it is optimal for
the Acquirer to make an Upper-Bound Offer. As noted previously,
such a bid ensures that the Acquirer will always purchase the Target.
To summarize the conclusions of this Section, when the Target
has a poison pill and an effective staggered board, the Acquirer’s optimal behavior will be one of three possibilities. If the Synergy (s) is
less than the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b), any offer that the Insiders
would accept would be worse for the Acquirer than not acquiring the
Target. Accordingly, the Acquirer will make an offer that is too low to
198

If y(p – b – vmin ) = y(s – b), then p – b – vmin = s – b. Adding b + vmin to both sides
of this equation yields p = s + vmin.
199
Note that the Acquirer is never harmed if the Insiders accept such an offer. In
its worst-case scenario, the transaction is a wash—it pays a Price equal to the Minimum
Target Value plus the Synergy and, in exchange, it receives the Target, which is worth
the Minimum Target Value, plus the Synergy.
200
The percentage of successful bids equals the ratio of (1) the Synergy minus the
Insiders’ Private Benefits to (2) the Maximum Target Value minus the Minimum Target
Value, or (s – b)/(vmax – vmin). See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 227-29; see also
infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 2 (establishing the Acquirer’s optimal strategy under a
larger set of conditions).
201
If AcmeCo’s value is uniformly distributed over the interval between $250 and
$750, the probability that AcmeCo is worth $450 or less is ($450 – $250)/($750 – $250)
= $200/$500 = 0.4 = 40%.
202
Recall that the Acquirer’s optimal Price (p) in this instance is vmin + s. Therefore, an increase in the Synergy creates a corresponding increase in the optimal Price.
See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 4 (establishing under more general conditions that
an increase in the Synergy increases the optimal Price).
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203

be accepted. Alternatively, if the Synergy (s) is more than the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b), the Acquirer’s optimal offer will be the minimum of (1) the sum of the Minimum Target Value (vmin) and the
Synergy (s) and (2) the sum of the Maximum Target Value (vmax) and
204
the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b). If it is the former, the Target will
only be acquired some of the time; if it is the latter, the Target will al205
ways be acquired.
D. The Poison Pill Without an Effective Staggered Board Model
The Poison Pill Without an ESB model has elements of both the
206
207
No Poison Pill model and the Poison Pill with ESB model. It treats
the takeover attempt as a two-step process. In the first step, the Acquirer makes an offer to the Insiders to buy the Target for a particular
Price. This corresponds to a would-be acquirer first attempting to ne208
If
gotiate a “friendly” deal with the target’s officers and directors.
the Insiders accept, the Acquirer purchases the Target and there is no
second step.
If the Insiders reject the Acquirer’s offer, the Acquirer makes the
same offer directly to the Shareholders, who can either accept or re209
ject it. If the Shareholders accept, the Target is acquired; otherwise,
the Target remains independent. This second step represents a
would-be acquirer’s attempt to take control of a target’s board of directors by waging a proxy fight in conjunction with a tender offer. If
the would-be acquirer successfully convinces the target’s shareholders
to vote for its slate of directors, the new directors will remove the poi-

203

See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 3. Technically, the model requires the Acquirer to make an offer. If the Synergy is less than the Insiders’ Private Benefits, the offer described in the text will be too low to ever be accepted, as the sum of the Minimum
Target Value and the Synergy will be less than the sum of the Minimum Target Value
and the Insiders’ Private Benefits, which is the lowest Price the Insiders will ever accept.
Nonetheless, it is analytically helpful to think of these scenarios as distinct cases.
204
See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 2.
205
See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 2.
206
See supra Section II.B.
207
See supra Section II.C.
208
See Gordon, supra note 2, at 823-24 (discussing how friendly deals are negotiated in the shadow of hostile takeover attempts and how failed friendly deals can become hostile ones).
209
See Schwert, supra note 49, at 2600 (arguing that deals often shift between being hostile and friendly during negotiations). But see Subramanian, supra note 3, at
661 n.169 (providing evidence via interviews that friendly and hostile takeovers represent fundamentally different deal tracks).
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son pill and clear the way for the takeover of the target corporation.
Figure 2.4 depicts the entire process as an extensive form game.
Figure 2.4: Poison Pill, No Effective Staggered Board
Acquirer Makes
Offer, p

Insiders
Reject
Insiders
Accept

Shareholders
Accept

Shareholders
Reject

Analyzing this model is much easier after analyzing the previous
two. The analysis starts with the Insiders. The Insiders’ incentives are
essentially the same as in the Poison Pill with ESB model described in
Section II.C. Accordingly, their decision rule is the same: they only
accept the Acquirer’s offer if the Price is greater than or equal to the
210
sum of the Actual Target Value and the Insiders’ Private Benefits.
Put another way, if the Insiders favor a particular takeover offer, they
should accept it. If they do not, they should reject it; the worst thing
that may happen in such an event—the Shareholders accepting the
offer—is the same as what would happen if the Insiders had themselves accepted it.
One of the Acquirer’s options is to make a bid geared toward the
Insiders (an “Insider-Oriented Offer”), in which it offers to buy the
Target at a Price (p) equal to the sum of the Minimum Target Value
211
(vmin) and the Synergy (s). The Insider-Oriented Offer is exactly the

210

See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 6.
Note that this amount may be less than the Initial Trading Price. While, in practice, takeover transactions almost always involve premiums, this is not always the case.
Bear Stearns famously agreed to sell itself to J.P. Morgan for $2 per share, less than 10%
of its market value at the time. Matthew Goldstein, JPMorgan Buys Bear on the Cheap,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 16, 2008, 7:47 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/
print/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2008/db20080316_356646.htm; Yalman Onaran, Fed
211
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same as the Acquirer’s optimal offer under the Poison Pill with ESB
model and, just as in that model, the Insiders will accept it some of the
212
For reasons discussed below, if the Insider-Oriented Offer is
time.
rejected by the Insiders, it will also be rejected by the Shareholders.
Such an offer essentially causes a poison pill with no effective staggered board to yield the same result as a poison pill with an effective
staggered board: in both cases, the Acquirer makes the same offer,
the Insiders react to it the same way, and their decision is final.
Next, consider what the Acquirer must offer to ensure that the
213
Shareholders always accept (a “Shareholder-Oriented Offer”).
As
Figure 2.4 illustrates, if the Acquirer’s offer reaches the Shareholders,
the Insiders have already rejected it. The Shareholders can therefore
deduce that the Insiders would prefer that the Target remain independent rather than be acquired at the price that the Acquirer is offering. Recall that, by definition, the Insiders are indifferent between
accepting and rejecting a takeover offer if the Price (p) is equal to the
sum of the Actual Target Value (v) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits
214
Thus, if the Insiders reject the Acquirer’s offer, the Price (p)
(b).
that the Acquirer is offering must be less than the sum of the Actual
Target Value (v) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b)—or, equivalently, the Actual Target Value is larger than the difference between
215
For clarity, we
the Price (p) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b).
define the difference between the Price (p) and the Insiders’ Private
Benefits (b) as the “Insiders’ Reservation Price.”
By rejecting the Acquirer’s offer, the Insiders may communicate
new information to the Shareholders about the Actual Target Value.
Originally, the Shareholders only knew that the Actual Target Value
(v) was distributed uniformly between the Minimum Target Value
(vmin) and the Maximum Target Value (vmax). Now, in addition to that
fact, they also know that the Actual Target Value is larger than the Insiders’ Reservation Price.
Aided Bear Stearns as Firm Faced Chapter 11, Bernanke Says, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2008),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=a7coicThgaEE.
212
See supra Section II.C.
213
The Shareholder-Oriented Offer may not reach the Shareholders, since the Insiders will sometimes accept it first. However, whenever the Insiders reject such an offer,
the Shareholders will accept it. It is somewhat akin to a predetermined price at which
the Shareholders agree to sell, like a “Buy It Now” price that enables a buyer on eBay to
end an auction by paying a particular preset price. Buying with the Buy It Now Option,
EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/how-buy-bin.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
214
See supra Section II.A.
215
The inequality p < v + b is equivalent to p – b < v.
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If the Insiders’ Reservation Price is less than the Minimum Target
Value (vmin), the Shareholders have not learned anything new and
cannot update their estimate of the Actual Target Value. Thus, their
position and their decision rule are the same as in the No Poison Pill
model—they accept the offer so long as the Price is greater than the
216
Initial Trading Price.
On the other hand, if the Insiders’ Reservation Price is larger than
the Minimum Target Value (vmin), the Shareholders can place a new,
higher floor on the Actual Target Value. The Shareholders can update their estimate of the Actual Target Value and thereby make a bet217
ter decision with respect to the Acquirer’s offer.
Put another way, the Shareholders now know that the Insiders,
who have better information than the Shareholders, but a higher res218
ervation price, oppose the Acquirer’s offer.
If the Insiders’ Private
Benefits are too large relative to the offered Price and the range of
possible Actual Target Values, the Insiders will always reject the Acquirer’s offer, regardless of the Actual Target Value. In that scenario,
the Insiders’ rejection of the Acquirer’s offer gives the Shareholders
no new insight, leaving them essentially in the same position as in the
219
No Poison Pill model. In such a case, the Shareholder-Oriented Offer is essentially the Initial Trading Price.
However, if the Insiders’ Private Benefits are not so large, the
Shareholders can adjust their estimate of the Actual Target Value.
The Shareholders will then know that the Actual Target Value is uniformly distributed over a range whose lower bound is the Insiders’
Reservation Price and whose upper bound is the Maximum Target
220
Value (vmax). Their new estimate of the Actual Target Value will be
221
the midpoint of this range.
The Shareholders’ optimal decision
rule will then be to accept the Acquirer’s offer if the Price is greater
than or equal to this amount and reject it otherwise.
216

See supra Section II.B. Compare infra Appendix A.3, Proposition 7 (providing
the shareholders’ decision rule in the Poison Pill Without ESB model), with infra Appendix A.1, Proposition 1 (providing the shareholders’ decision rule in the No Poison
Pill model).
217
See infra Appendix A.3, Proposition 7.
218
Cf. Eddey & Casey, supra note 160, at 2 (“In defending against a bid, directors
have the opportunity to act in the interests of . . . shareholders, or to act having regard to
their own personal interests.”).
219
See supra Section II.B.
220
An interval subset of a uniform distribution is itself a uniform distribution.
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 227.
221
See id. at 229.
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Mathematically, this corresponds to accepting the Acquirer’s offer
whenever it equals or exceeds the difference between the Maximum
222
If the
Target Value (vmax) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b).
range of possible Actual Target Values is sufficiently large relative to
the Insiders’ Private Benefits, the Shareholder-Oriented Offer will be
this amount. Because the Acquirer can always acquire a Target that
has a poison pill but no effective staggered board by offering a Price
equal to this amount, it will never offer more.
Like the Upper-Bound Offer in the Poison Pill with ESB model,
the Shareholder-Oriented Offer defeats the adverse-selection prob223
lem.
The Shareholder-Oriented Offer is generally more than the
224
Acquirer would pay if the Target did not have a poison pill, but less
225
than the Upper-Bound Offer. There are also instances in which the
Shareholder-Oriented Offer allows the Acquirer to profitably acquire
the Target even though the Synergy is smaller than the Insiders’ Pri226
vate Benefits, which is never the case under the Poison Pill with ESB
227
model.
We can clarify and illustrate these points with our recurring AcmeCo Example, in which AcmeCo is worth between $250 and $750.
Assume that the Insiders’ Private Benefits are $300 and that, as in Section II.B, BuyerCo offers a Price of $510. Whatever the Actual Target
Value of AcmeCo is, the Insiders will always reject BuyerCo’s offer;
even if AcmeCo were merely worth the Minimum Target Value
($250), BuyerCo’s offer ($510) would be less than the sum of AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value ($250) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits
($300). BuyerCo’s offer is then presented to the Shareholders. Since
228
the amount of the Insiders’ Private Benefits is publicly known, the
222

If the Price equals or exceeds the average of the Maximum Target Value and
the difference between the Price and the Insiders’ Private Benefits, then p ≥ ½(p – b +
vmax) ↔ 2p ≥ (p – b + vmax) ↔ p ≥ vmax – b.
223
For discussion of the adverse-selection problem, see supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
224
If the difference between the Maximum Target Value and the Insiders’ Private
Benefits is less than the Initial Trading Price, the Shareholder-Oriented Offer will be the
same as the Acquirer’s optimal offer in the No Poison Pill model. See supra Section II.B.
225
An Upper-Bound Offer equals the sum of the Maximum Target Value and the
Insiders’ Private Benefits. See supra Section II.C.
226
Suppose AcmeCo is worth between $250 and $750, the Synergy is $100, the Insiders’ Private Benefits are $200, and AcmeCo has a poison pill but no staggered board.
The Acquirer’s optimal strategy would be to make the Shareholder-Oriented Offer of
$550, which gives the Acquirer an expected utility of $50 ($500 + $100 – $550 = $50).
227
See supra Section II.C; infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 3.
228
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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Shareholders know that the Insiders would have rejected BuyerCo’s
offer even if AcmeCo were worth the Minimum Target Value ($250).
Therefore, the Insiders’ action tells the Shareholders nothing new
about AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value. The Shareholders only know
that the Actual Target Value of AcmeCo is evenly distributed between
the Minimum Target Value ($250) and the Maximum Target Value
($750). The Shareholders therefore expect AcmeCo’s Actual Target
Value to be $500. The $510 Price that BuyerCo is offering is more
229
than this amount, so the Shareholders accept BuyerCo’s offer.
Now consider a scenario identical to the previous one except that
the Insiders’ Private Benefits are only $100. If the Insiders reject BuyerCo’s $510 offer, the Shareholders can deduce that AcmeCo’s Actual
Target Value is at least $410, the difference between the Price that
BuyerCo is offering ($510) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits ($100).
Until the Insiders rejected BuyerCo’s offer, the Shareholders only
knew that AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value was at least $250. Initially,
the Shareholders expected AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value to be the
Initial Trading Price ($500), which is halfway between the Minimum
Target Value ($250) and the Maximum Target Value ($750). Now,
however, the Shareholders know that AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value is
between $410 and $750. Since the Actual Target Value is drawn from
230
a uniform distribution over this interval, the Shareholders’ new ex231
Since
pectation for AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value will be $580.
BuyerCo is only offering a Price of $510, the Shareholders will reject
232
BuyerCo’s offer.
Finally, suppose that all of the facts of the previous scenario are
unchanged, except that BuyerCo now offers a Price of $650. If the Insiders reject this offer, the Shareholders can deduce that AcmeCo’s
Actual Target Value is at least $550, the difference between the Price
that BuyerCo is offering ($650) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits
($100). Knowing that AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value is uniformly distributed between $550 and $750, the Shareholders’ new expectation
for AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value will be $650. Since BuyerCo’s of-

229

Note that the offered Price ($510) is more than the difference ($450) between
the Maximum Target Value ($750) and the Private Benefits ($300).
230
See supra note 220.
231
The expected value of a uniformly distributed variable is the mean of the distribution’s endpoints. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 229. Here, that mean is
½($410 + $750) = ½($1160) = $580.
232
Note that the offered Price ($510) is less than the difference ($650) between
the Maximum Target Value ($750) and the Private Benefits ($100).
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fered Price is $650, the Shareholders will be indifferent between accepting and rejecting BuyerCo’s offer and, by assumption, will accept
233
Since the Shareholders will always accept an offer of $650, the
it.
Acquirer will never make a higher offer. Under the No Poison Pill
model, the Acquirer could offer less—$510, for example—and the
Shareholders would always accept it because it would be more than
234
the Initial Trading Price. On the other hand, under the Poison Pill
with ESB model, the Acquirer must make the Upper-Bound Offer of
235
$850 to guarantee an acquisition.
Either the Insider-Oriented Offer or the Shareholder-Oriented
236
Offer can be optimal for the Acquirer, depending on the values of
237
the parameters in a specific case.
It is somewhat complicated and
238
unintuitive to describe precisely when each strategy dominates.
In
general, the Insider-Oriented Offer will be optimal when the difference between the Maximum Target Value and the Minimum Target
Value is large, but the Synergy and the Insiders’ Private Benefits are
233

Note that the offered Price ($650) is exactly the difference between the Maximum Target Value ($750) and the Private Benefits ($100).
234
See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
235
See supra Section II.C.
236
Studies suggest that a poison pill, by itself, reduces takeovers little if at all. See
sources cited supra note 59. But see Coates, supra note 6, at 286-97 (critiquing the
methodologies of such studies). This could suggest that when the Target has a poison
pill but no effective staggered board the Acquirer’s optimal strategy will usually be to
make the Shareholder-Oriented Offer.
237
For the Acquirer, the expected utility of the Shareholder-Oriented Offer is the
sum of the expected Actual Target Value and the Synergy minus the amount of the
Shareholder-Oriented Offer. Mathematically, this is expressed as v̄ + s – max(v̄ , vmax – b)
= min(s, s + b – ½(vmax – vmin)).
Calculating the Acquirer’s expected utility from the Insider-Oriented Offer is more
complicated. When the offer is rejected, the Acquirer gets zero utility. When it is accepted, the Acquirer’s net utility is the sum of the Actual Target Value and the Synergy,
minus the Insider-Oriented Offer, which itself is the sum of the Minimum Target Value
and the Synergy. This may be expressed mathematically as v + s – (vmin + s) = v – vmin.
The Actual Target Value, given that the Insiders accept the Insider-Oriented Offer, is
uniformly distributed from the Minimum Target Value to the sum of the Minimum
Target Value and the difference between the Synergy and the Insiders’ Private Benefits.
Accordingly, the expected Actual Target Value, given that the Insider-Oriented Offer is
accepted, will be the midpoint of this range, vmin + ½(s – b). Therefore, the Acquirer’s
expected net utility when the Insider-Oriented Offer is accepted is vmin + ½(s – b) – vmin =
½(s – b). The Insider-Oriented Offer is accepted when the sum of the Minimum Target
Value and the Synergy equals or exceeds the sum of the Actual Target Value and the
-1
Insiders’ Private Benefits. The probability of this occurring is (s – b)(vmax – vmin) if s ≥ b,
2
-1
and is zero otherwise. Acquirer’s expected utility is thus ½(s – b) (vmax – vmin) if s ≥ b,
and is zero otherwise. See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 6 (establishing more generally that Acquirer’s optimal offer may target either the Shareholders or the Insiders).
238
See infra Appendix A.3, Proposition 7.
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239

small, and the Shareholder-Oriented Offer will be optimal when the
240
reverse is true.
It is helpful to illustrate each of these possibilities with a numerical example. Returning to our recurring AcmeCo example in which
AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value is between $250 and $750, assume that
the Insiders’ Private Benefits are $150 and that the Synergy is $250. If
BuyerCo makes the Shareholder-Oriented Offer, it will offer a Price of
241
242
Such an offer is always enough to acquire AcmeCo, and
$600.
BuyerCo’s expected utility is the sum of AcmeCo’s expected Actual
Target Value ($500) and the Synergy ($250), minus the Price that
BuyerCo offers ($600). The Shareholder-Oriented Offer therefore
gives BuyerCo an expected utility of $150.
If BuyerCo makes the Insider-Oriented Offer, it will offer a Price
243
of $500.
The Shareholders will always reject this offer, but the Insiders will accept it when AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value is less than
244
245
On average, this will happen 20% of the time.
BuyerCo’s
$350.
expected utility when its offer is accepted will be the sum of AcmeCo’s
expected Actual Target Value when the Insiders accept BuyerCo’s of246
fer ($300) and the Synergy ($250), minus the Price BuyerCo offers
($500). Thus, BuyerCo’s expected net utility when its offer is accepted is $50. Since its offer is accepted 20% of the time, its expected net
utility overall is $10. As BuyerCo would prefer to have $150 of utility
over $10 of utility, under this set of facts, the strategy of making a
Shareholder-Oriented Offer dominates.

239

When this is true, the expected utility from the Shareholder-Oriented Offer,
min(s, s + b – ½(vmax – vmin)), is likely to be negative, whereas the utility from the Insid2
-1
er-Oriented Offer, ½(s – b) (vmax – vmin) if s ≥ b and zero otherwise, is never negative.
See infra Appendix I.C, at Proposition 7.
240
2
When s – b < vmax – vmin, the utility of the Insider-Oriented Offer, ½(s – b) (vmax –
-1
vmin) , will be less than ½(s – b), which is likely to be less than the expected utility of the
Shareholder-Oriented Offer, min(s, s + b – ½(vmax – vmin)).
241
The Shareholder-Oriented Offer is the difference between the Maximum Target
Value (vmax) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b). Thus, vmax – b = $750 – $150 = $600.
242
The Insiders will accept such an offer 40% of the time (($600 – $150 –
$250)/($750 – $250) = $200/$500 = 40%), and the Shareholders will accept it the other
60% of the time.
243
The Insider-Oriented Offer is the sum of the Minimum Target Value (vmin) and
the Synergy (s). Thus, vmin + s = $250 + $250 = $500.
244
The difference between the Price (p) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b) is
$350. If the Insiders know that the Actual Target Value (v) is less than this amount,
they will accept the offer.
245
($500 – $150 – $250)/($750 – $250) = $100/$500 = 20%.
246
½($350 + $250) = $300.
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Now suppose the same facts as above, except that the Insiders’
Private Benefits are $30 instead of $150. To make the Shareholder247
Oriented Offer, BuyerCo must offer a Price of $720. Such an offer
248
is always enough to acquire AcmeCo, and BuyerCo’s expected utility
is the sum of AcmeCo’s expected Actual Target Value ($500) and the
Synergy ($250), minus the Price that BuyerCo pays ($720). BuyerCo’s
expected net utility is therefore $30.
Compare this with the outcome when BuyerCo makes the Insider249
Oriented Offer of $500. The Shareholders will always reject such an
offer, but the Insiders will accept it if AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value is
250
less than $470, which happens 44% of the time on average. When its
offer is accepted, BuyerCo’s expected utility will be the sum of AcmeCo’s expected Actual Target Value, given that the Insiders accepted
251
BuyerCo’s offer ($360), and the Synergy ($250), minus the Price
BuyerCo pays ($500). This gives BuyerCo expected utility of $110 when
its offer is accepted. The remaining 56% of the time, BuyerCo’s expected utility is zero. Therefore, BuyerCo’s expected utility from making the Insider-Oriented Offer is $48.40. As BuyerCo prefers $48.40 of
utility to $30 of utility, the Insider-Oriented Offer is optimal.
E. The Integrated Model
We now integrate the three separate models presented in Sections
II.B-D into a single unified model by including an initial step in which
the Target’s level of takeover defenses is determined. As previously
discussed, a target may quickly adopt a poison pill if its state of incor252
poration allows and it is not otherwise restricted from doing so.
Thus, the choice of whether to have a poison pill is best thought of as
a question of where a corporation chooses to incorporate and the
content of its corporate charter. The choice of whether to install an
effective staggered board generally does not relate to the choice of
253
state of incorporation because all states permit staggered boards; the
decision to install an effective staggered board is therefore purely a
247

vmax – b = $750 – $30 = $720.
The Insiders accept such a bid 88% of the time (($720 – $30 – $250)/($750 –
$250) = $440/$500 = 88%), and the Shareholders will accept it the other 12% of the
time.
249
vmin + s = $250 + $250 = $500.
250
($500 – $30 – $250)/($750 – $250) = $220/$500 = 44%.
251
½($250 + $470) = $360.
252
See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
253
See sources cited supra note 61.
248
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question of corporate governance and depends solely on the contents
of the corporate charter.
There are competing views on how these decisions are made
among different legal and corporate governance regimes. One school
of thought, shareholder primacy, suggests that the interests of a firm’s
shareholders motivate its choice of the appropriate level of antitakeover
254
defenses.
Another school of thought, managerialism, holds that the
255
interests of managers drive firms’ decisionmaking. Figure 2.5 shows
the integrated Shareholder Primacy model, and Figure 2.6 shows the
integrated Managerialist model.
Figure 2.5: Integrated Shareholder Primacy Model
Shareholders Choose
Antitakeover Defenses

No Poison Pill

Acquirer Makes
Offer, p

Poison Pill
but No ESB

Poison Pill
and ESB

Acquirer Makes
Offer, p

Acquirer Makes
Offer, p

Shareholders Shareholders
Accept
Reject

Insiders
Accept

Insiders
Reject

Insiders Insiders
Accept
Reject

Shareholders Shareholders
Accept
Reject

254

See Dodd & Leftwich, supra note 78, at 267 (arguing that managers choose to
incorporate in the state that allows the corporation to earn the most profits, which is
what shareholders want); Winter, supra note 77, at 256 (arguing that competition in
the capital markets will properly incentivize firms choosing among legal regimes).
255
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 198 (“Managerialism conceives the corporation
as [a] bureaucratic hierarchy dominated by professional managers.”); Cary, supra note
77, at 666 (describing modern corporate law as “enabling” managerial independence
and as having “watered the rights of shareholders . . . down to a thin gruel”).
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Figure 2.6: Integrated Managerialist Model
Insiders Choose
Antitakeover Defenses

No Poison Pill

Acquirer Makes
Offer, p

Poison Pill
but No ESB

Poison Pill
and ESB

Acquirer Makes
Offer, p

Acquirer Makes
Offer, p

Shareholders Shareholders
Accept
Reject

Insiders
Accept

Insiders
Reject

Insiders Insiders
Accept
Reject

Shareholders Shareholders
Accept
Reject

Before considering these integrated models, however, it is necessary to discuss the different context in which they are situated. The
models analyzed above address situations in which there is a single potential Acquirer. If there are several potential purchasers willing to
pay similar prices, then the Shareholders may have the opportunity to
256
use an auction to raise the eventual purchase price. The availability
of the auction mechanism greatly enhances the Target’s negotiating
leverage and, accordingly, the premiums that the Shareholders are
257
Many takeover attempts, including some of the
likely to receive.
258
259
most dramatic, involve several potential acquirers.
Thus, it is po256

See Moeller et al., supra note 24, at 217 (performing a statistical study and concluding that competitive pressure among potential bidders lowers their average returns
on acquisitions); see also sources cited supra note 72.
257
See sources cited supra note 72. But see Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin,
How Are Firms Sold? 16 (Mar. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=642306 (finding no statistical difference between returns to target
shareholders from auctions and negotiations with a single bidder).
258
See, e.g., BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 1, at 477-505 (providing a detailed
narrative of the frenzied takeover of RJR Nabisco).
259
Some authors have attempted to measure the degree of competition among
acquirers by looking at the number of bidders publicly attempting to acquire the target. See, e.g., Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON.
PERSP. 103, 106-07 (2001); Schwert, supra note 49, at 2601, 2630-32; see also Moeller et
al., supra note 24, at 208, 210 (recognizing that looking at “whether multiple firms
make a public bid for the same target” is underinclusive, but, if one looks at “it as a
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tentially problematic to analyze choices of defense levels with the
models presented above, which do not apply to such situations.
However, there is a good argument that applying our earlier
models in this way is appropriate, with some caveats. When there are
multiple potential acquirers, federal laws governing takeover attempts
are likely sufficient to allow auctions to form, regardless of the target’s
260
level of defenses.
Increased defense levels may provide some marginal benefits in this context, but they are likely to be relatively
261
In the absence of multiple Acquirers, however, our models
small.
predict that disparate levels of defenses will produce substantial dif262
ferences in expected outcomes. Therefore, it is sensible to use these
models to gain insight into the choice of takeover defense levels, even
though they only depict a subset of the takeover attempts that a target
might encounter.
1. Shareholder Primacy Approach
First, consider the Shareholder Primacy model of Figure 2.5.
Which level of antitakeover defenses maximizes the Shareholders’ expected utility?
No Poison Pill Model. If the Target does not have a poison pill, the
Target is always acquired at a purchase price that is slightly above the
Initial Trading Price. On average, this gives the Shareholders approximately the same utility that they would have received if they had simply continued to own the Target.
Poison Pill Without ESB Model. If the Target has a poison pill but no
effective staggered board, the Acquirer has two potentially optimal
strategies: making the Insider-Oriented Offer or making the Shareholder-Oriented Offer. If the Acquirer makes the Insider-Oriented Of-

proxy for competition,” it suggests that “competition is rare”). A more recent study
looked at bidder involvement in the early stages of the M&A process and found that
slightly more than half of all takeovers involve multiple bidders. Boone & Mulherin,
supra note 257, at 2, 29.
260
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (2011) (requiring that tender offers remain
open for at least twenty business days); see also Subramanian, supra note 3, at 630-33
(discussing laws and regulations that limit bidders’ abilities to launch short-lived offers).
261
Cf. Subramanian, supra note 3, at 644-45 (pointing out that if a bidder has attractive alternatives and a seller does not, strong legal defenses will be ineffectual in
helping a seller negotiate an attractive deal).
262
Cf. id. at 642 (constructing a “stylized takeover negotiation” in which the acquirer and target maintained a “bilateral monopoly” or, in other words, “the only options for the target [were] a deal with the given acquirer or no deal at all, and the only
options for the acquirer [were] a deal with the given target or no deal at all”).
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fer, the Shareholders’ utility will be the Actual Target Value (if the Insiders reject the offer) or the Insider-Oriented Offer (if the Insiders accept it). On average, this amount equals or exceeds the Initial Trading
Price, which is what they would receive if the Target had no poison pill.
If the Acquirer makes the Shareholder-Oriented Offer, it will always be accepted and the Shareholders’ utility will be the ShareholderOriented Offer, which is always at least as much as the Initial Trading
Price. Accordingly, a poison pill without an effective staggered board
always gives the Shareholders at least as much utility as no poison pill
and, in many instances, it gives them more.
Poison Pill with ESB Model. If the Target has both a poison pill and
an effective staggered board, the Acquirer’s optimal offer is the lesser
of (1) the sum of the Synergy and the Minimum Target Value and (2)
the sum of the Maximum Target Value and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (the Upper-Bound Offer). The former is the same amount as the
Insider-Oriented Offer discussed above. The latter represents the
highest amount of utility that the Shareholders can ever receive under
any of the models. Thus, the Shareholders always receive at least as
much utility as they do when the Target has a poison pill but no effective staggered board, and the Acquirer makes the Insider-Oriented
Offer. Accordingly, a poison pill with an effective staggered board always gives the Shareholders at least as much utility as no poison pill,
and often gives them more.
Therefore, the Shareholders always prefer having a poison pill,
but may or may not prefer an effective staggered board, depending on
the circumstances. Specifying when an effective staggered board is
optimal is somewhat complicated. The intuition, however, is that the
Shareholders must determine how much of a role to give the Insiders
in the negotiating process. Giving the Insiders more control over the
negotiations can benefit the Shareholders by allowing them to take
advantage of the Insiders’ superior information and higher reservation price. At the same time, however, the Insiders’ incentives diverge
from the Shareholders’, which can cause them to act against the
Shareholders’ interests. In the Poison Pill Without ESB model, the
Shareholders have the ability to overrule the Insiders through the ballot box safety valve if they decide that the Insiders are not acting in ac263
cordance with their interests. In the Poison Pill with ESB model, the

263

See Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 929 (noting that “the ballot box mechanism
seems to be a viable mechanism against non-ESB targets” and providing examples of
successful takeover attempts that used this mechanism).
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264

ballot box safety valve is foreclosed, and the Insiders largely have a
free hand.
It may seem surprising that the Shareholders would ever want to relinquish control over the Insiders. But, because the Insiders are more
reluctant to sell than the Shareholders are, this may force the Acquirer
to make a higher offer than it would have to make if the Shareholders
were controlling the transaction. Thus, by adopting an effective staggered board, the Shareholders are essentially tying their own hands in
the hopes that, by giving their negotiators greater power, they will ulti265
mately be able to extract a higher purchase price from the Acquirer.
Such measures, in which an actor limits the courses of action available
266
to it, are generally referred to as “commitment devices.”
A somewhat silly but easily understandable example helps illuminate the concept. Suppose you have a painting that you wish to sell,
that you have a low reservation price, and that you know relatively little about art. Suppose further that you have a more knowledgeable
friend who has a good idea of what the painting is worth and who is
willing to help you, but who has a higher reservation price.
One way to structure the negotiating process would be to oversee
your friend’s negotiations with potential buyers. If a potential buyer offers a price that you find attractive and that your friend is not willing to
accept, you can overrule your friend and accept the offer. This lets you
limit the agency costs created by the divergence between your incentives and your friend’s. However, you may end up selling the painting
for a lower price than your friend might have secured if you had stayed
out of the negotiation. This interaction resembles a takeover attempt
under the Poison Pill Without ESB model. Instead of jumping into
264

See id. at 927-29 (finding “not a single ballot box victory against the ESB targets”
within the sample takeovers studied).
265
See Bugeja & Walter, supra note 19, at 42-43 (finding that “target firms obtain
higher abnormal returns when target management recommends rejection of the offer”); Graham L. Hubbard, Targeting the Takeover, 39 PROF. ADMIN. 13, 15 (1987)
(Austl.) (finding that winning tender premiums for firms that initially resist offers are
significantly greater).
266
See Werner Raub & Gideon Keren, Hostages as a Commitment Device, 21 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 43, 44 (1993) (analyzing the use of hostages as a commitment device).
A commitment device may be valuable if it induces other actors to behave in ways that
benefit the committer. For example, in the game of “Chicken”—in which two cars drive
directly at each other at deadly speeds until one driver swerves away—throwing your
steering wheel out the window is a winning strategy. Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality
Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 263 (2010). Commitment devices may also
be valuable if they enable a person to act at an early point to control his subsequent actions. Perhaps the most famous literary example is Odysseus having himself tied to the
mast so he could not heed the Sirens’ call. Bainbridge, supra note 45, at 1-2.
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the negotiations directly, the Shareholders check the Insiders by siding with the Acquirer in the proxy fight.
Another possibility is to stay out of the transaction entirely until
your friend comes to you with an offer that she thinks you should accept. This guarantees that you do not accept a price that is below your
friend’s reservation price, which is more than you might have gotten if
you were to accept any offer above your own reservation price. If the
painting may be extremely valuable, this might be a good tactic. The
risk of this approach is that there may be buyers willing to pay your
reservation price for the painting, but not your friend’s. If so, there
will be no sale, even though there are buyers willing to pay a price you
would accept. This scenario corresponds to that of a Target with a
poison pill and an effective staggered board. By effectively foreclosing
a ballot-box revolt, the Shareholders have taken themselves out of the
process and left their agents to work out a deal.
The relative benefits of accountability and a commitment device
depend on the values of the parameters in a given situation. In general, effective staggered boards tend to be optimal for the Shareholders when the Synergy is very high relative to the Insiders’ Private Benefits and the range of possible Actual Target Values. If the Synergy is
large enough, the Shareholders will always prefer for the Target to
267
have an effective staggered board. Subsection II.E.2 provides examples that help illustrate these points.
2. Managerialist Approach
Analyzing the Managerialist model of Figure 2.6 is easier after the
analysis of the Shareholder Primacy model. That analysis showed that
the Shareholders always prefer a poison pill, and sometimes prefer an
effective staggered board. The Insiders’ utility function is the same as
the Shareholders’, except that the Insiders receive less utility from
takeovers. There is always a takeover when the Target has no poison
268
pill, which makes not having a poison pill even less attractive to the
Insiders than to the Shareholders. Thus, the Insiders always prefer a
poison pill.
There is a greater chance of a takeover when the Target has a poison pill but no effective staggered board than when the Target has
269
both a poison pill and an effective staggered board. Thus, the Insid267
268
269

See infra Appendix B, Proposition 9.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Sections II.C-D.
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ers will favor an effective staggered board in more cases than the
270
Shareholders, but either level of takeover defenses may be optimal
271
for the Insiders in a given instance. It may seem surprising that the
Insiders ever prefer to allow the Shareholders to overrule their wishes.
The intuition behind this result is that, when Private Benefits are small,
the Insiders’ utility is very similar to the Shareholders’. In such a case,
the Insiders may reap a net benefit from the higher ShareholderOriented Offer, even though it leads to some takeovers that the Insiders oppose.
Some numerical examples help illustrate how different parameters cause Shareholders and Insiders to favor different levels of antitakeover defenses.
Example 1: Effective Staggered Board Not Optimal for Both. Assume
again that AcmeCo is worth between $250 and $750, with an expected
value of $500. Assume further that Private Benefits are $50 and the
Synergy is $250. If AcmeCo has a poison pill and no effective staggered board, BuyerCo’s optimal strategy is to make the Shareholder272
Oriented Offer of $700. This offer is always accepted and results in
$650 of utility for the Insiders and $700 for the Shareholders.
If AcmeCo has a poison pill and an effective staggered board,
BuyerCo’s optimal strategy is to make the Insider-Oriented Offer of
273
$500.
When the Insiders accept this offer, their utility is $450 and
the Shareholders’ is $500. When the Insiders reject this offer, the In274
siders’ and the Shareholders’ expected utility is $600. BuyerCo’s offer is accepted 40% of the time and rejected 60% of the time. Accord270

See infra Appendix B, Proposition 10.
Cf. Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L.
149, 187-88 (2008) (examining instances in which managers acted to remove staggered
boards and finding evidence that unvested options—which are forfeited if the manager is fired but which usually vest immediately in the event of a takeover—influence
managers’ decisions to destagger boards); Subramanian, supra note 82, at 1872-73
(finding that state law takeover protections increase incorporations, but that the states
offering the most protection receive fewer incorporations).
272
BuyerCo’s expected utility from making the Shareholder-Oriented Offer is
AcmeCo’s expected Actual Target Value ($500) plus the Synergy ($250) minus the
amount of the Shareholder-Oriented Offer ($700). This totals $50. When the InsiderOriented Offer of $500 is accepted, BuyerCo’s expected utility is $100, which is the
sum of the expected Actual Target Value of AcmeCo, given that the Insiders have accepted BuyerCo’s offer (½($250 + $450) = $350), and the Synergy ($250) minus the
amount of the Insider-Oriented Offer ($500). The Insider-Oriented Offer is accepted
40% of the time (($450 – $250)/($750 – $250) = $200/$500 = 40%), giving BuyerCo
$40 expected utility.
273
vmin + s = $250 + $250 = $500. See supra Section II.C.
274
½($450 + $750) = $600.
271
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ingly, the Insiders’ expected utility is $540 and the Shareholders’
276
expected utility is $560.
In this instance, the Insiders would prefer
not to have an effective staggered board (because $650 > $540), and
neither would the Shareholders (because $700 > $560).
Example 2: Effective Staggered Board Optimal for Insiders but Not Shareholders. Now suppose the same facts as Example 1, except that Private
Benefits are $150 instead of $50. If AcmeCo has a poison pill and no
effective staggered board, the Shareholder-Oriented Offer remains
277
BuyerCo’s best strategy, but that offer is now $600 instead of $700.
This offer is always accepted and results in $450 of utility for the Insiders and $600 for the Shareholders.
If AcmeCo has a poison pill and an effective staggered board,
BuyerCo’s optimal strategy is to make the Insider-Oriented Offer of
278
$500.
When the Insiders accept this offer, their utility is $350 and
the Shareholders’ utility is $500. When the Insiders reject this offer,
279
the Insiders’ and the Shareholders’ expected utility is $550. The Insiders accept BuyerCo’s offer 20% of the time and reject it 80% of the
280
281
Accordingly, the Insiders’ expected utility is $510 and the
time.
282
Shareholders’ expected utility is $540. The Insiders would prefer to
have an effective staggered board in this instance (because $450 <
$510), but the Shareholders would prefer not to have one (because
$600 > $540).
Example 3: Effective Staggered Board Optimal for Both. Example 2’s
result changes, however, if BuyerCo stands to receive $450 of Synergy
from acquiring AcmeCo and all other parameters are held constant.
If AcmeCo has a poison pill but no effective staggered board, the

275

40%($450) = $180. 60%($600) = $360. $180 + $360 = $540.
40%($500) = $200. 60%($600) = $360. $200 + $360 = $560.
277
BuyerCo’s expected utility from making the Shareholder-Oriented Offer is AcmeCo’s expected Actual Target Value ($500) plus the Synergy ($250) minus the amount
of the Shareholder-Oriented Offer ($600). This totals $150. Even when the InsiderOriented Offer of $500 is accepted, BuyerCo’s expected utility is only $50. BuyerCo’s
utility in such an instance would be the sum of the Actual Target Value of AcmeCo and
the Synergy ($250), minus the amount of the Insider-Oriented Offer ($500). The expected Actual Target Value of AcmeCo, given that the Insiders have accepted BuyerCo’s
$500 offer, is $350 (½($250 + $350) = $300). $300 + $250 – $500 = $50.
278
vmin + s = $250 + $250 = $500. See supra Section II.C.
279
½($350 + $750) = $550.
280
($350 – $250)/($750 – $250) = $100/$500 = 20%.
281
20%($350) = $70. 80%($550) = $440. $70 + $440 = $510.
282
20%($500) = $100. 80%($550) = $440. $100 + $440 = $540.
276
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Shareholder-Oriented Offer of $600 remains BuyerCo’s best option.
As before, this offer is always accepted and results in $450 of utility for
the Insiders and $600 of utility for the Shareholders.
If AcmeCo has a poison pill and an effective staggered board,
BuyerCo’s optimal strategy is to make the Insider-Oriented Offer of
$700. When the Insiders accept this offer, their utility is $550 and the
Shareholders’ utility is $700. When the Insiders reject this offer, both
284
the Insiders and the Shareholders receive expected utility of $650.
The Insiders accept BuyerCo’s offer 60% of the time and reject it 40%
285
286
of the time. Accordingly, the Insiders’ expected utility is $590 and
287
the Shareholders’ expected utility is $680. On these facts, the Insiders prefer to have an effective staggered board (because $590 > $450)
as do the Shareholders (because $680 > $600).
3. Social Welfare Analysis
After having considered two possible ways in which takeover defense levels may be chosen, the analysis shifts to which takeover defense levels maximize social welfare. The social welfare function is de288
fined as the sum of the Shareholders’ and Acquirer’s utilities. This
function does not account for distributional concerns between the
Acquirer and the Shareholders. This seems sensible, as both the Acquirer and the Target are likely to be large public firms owned by dif289
fuse and diversified shareholders.
In the event of a takeover, the Acquirer’s utility will be the sum of
the Actual Target Value and the Synergy, minus the Price that it pays
283

The analysis resembles that of note 277, supra, except BuyerCo’s utility is increased by $200 when it makes the Shareholder-Oriented Offer and when the InsiderOriented Offer is accepted.
284
½($550 + $750) = $650.
285
($550 – $250)/($750 – $250) = $300/$500 = 60%.
286
60%($550) = $330. 40%($650) = $260. $330 + $260 = $590.
287
60%($700) = $420. 40%($650) = $260. $420 + $260 = $680.
288
While the displacement that the Insiders suffer from a takeover of the Target is
a real social loss, for nearly all public targets, the takeover’s effect on the utility of the
Acquirer and the Shareholders will likely dwarf its effect on the utility of the Insiders.
See Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 106-10 (evaluating the private benefit hypothesis); Klausner, supra note 84, at 768-69, 774 (discussing the notion that managers may
“buy” defenses from shareholders and identifying the necessary price as between 1%
and 5% of the firm’s value). We therefore disregard it for simplicity.
289
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 8 (assuming that investors hold “diversified portfolios”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 1167 n.17 (“Both theory
and evidence suggest that if . . . risks are diversifiable, shareholders will be indifferent
to them . . . .”).
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for the Target. The Shareholders’ utility will be the Price that the Acquirer pays for the Target. Since our chosen social welfare function
adds the Acquirer’s and the Shareholders’ utilities, the Price drops
out of the calculation and social welfare equals the Actual Target Value plus the Synergy.
If there is no takeover, the Acquirer’s utility will be zero and the
Shareholders’ utility will be the Actual Target Value. Social welfare is
therefore the Actual Target Value. Thus, a takeover increases social
290
welfare.
Accordingly, the socially optimal level of takeover defenses is the
level that maximizes the number of takeovers. Given the choice of social welfare function, this makes intuitive sense. Successful takeovers
create social gains by increasing the size of the economic pie by the
amount of the Synergy. Other than the Synergy, the elements of the
social welfare function are either exogenous (the Actual Target Value) or transfer payments that cancel out (the Price that the Acquirer
291
pays and that the Shareholders receive).
Therefore, the socially optimal level of takeover defenses is No
292
Poison Pill, which always leads to takeovers at small premiums. Unfortunately, the analyses in subsections II.E.1 and II.E.2 suggest that
neither the Shareholders nor the Insiders should be expected to
choose the socially efficient level of takeover defenses.
III. FURTHER PREDICTIONS AND EXPANSIONS
This Part attempts to place these models into further context. It
begins by exploring several interesting implications of the models. It
then compares these predictions to the findings of empirical studies
and suggests additional empirical work that could be done to test the
extent to which these models accurately reflect reality. Finally, it addresses several of the models’ simplifying assumptions and the likely
consequences of relaxing them.

290

Recall the earlier assumption that the Synergy represents a social gain, and not
merely a distributive one. See supra text accompanying note 143.
291
Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 8 (arguing that raising takeover
premiums does not benefit investors because they are diversified, so any extra returns
they receive as target shareholders is canceled out by the reduced returns they receive
as shareholders of acquirers).
292
Supra Section II.B.
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A. Predictions and Implications
1. State Competition for Charters and Federalization
of Corporate Law
Our models have direct implications for the postulated “race to the
top” or “race to the bottom” created by state-level control of corporate
law. Contrary to prior theory, our models suggest that the proliferation
of rules making takeovers easier or more difficult may not necessarily
suggest either a race to the bottom or a race to the top. Similarly, a
firm that raises or lowers its takeover defenses is not necessarily re293
sponding to managerial or shareholder interests, respectively.
Although Insiders often prefer a higher level of takeover defenses than
Shareholders do in our models, Shareholders never choose the lowest
294
level of defenses and Insiders do not always choose the highest. The
Shareholders’ and Insiders’ preferences depend on the Target’s particular characteristics, and there are instances in which both groups
295
prefer the same level of defenses.
At the same time, our models reinforce the notion that the postulated race to the top is a competition to serve the interests of the
corporation’s shareholders and not the interests of society as a whole.
The models predict that a corporation’s shareholders will always prefer to have a poison pill because they enable the shareholders to ex296
tract distributional gains from the Acquirer.
This is socially inefficient because it reduces the frequency of socially beneficial takeovers
297
and reduces the Acquirer’s incentives to engage in them, but this is
immaterial to the Shareholders, who are self-interested actors concerned with their own utility. Diversified shareholders would be willing to relinquish their firm’s takeover defenses if other firms (who are

293

Cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 71, at 171-74 (arguing that increased
defenses are always against shareholder interests); Ganor, supra note 271, at 185 (arguing that managers who dismantle staggered boards further shareholder interests);
Subramanian, supra note 82, at 1801 (contending that states offering the most protection against takeovers receive fewer incorporations due to shareholder backlash).
294
See supra subsections II.E.1-2.
295
See supra subsections II.E.1-2.
296
See supra Section II.E; see also Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 85 (finding
that in their sample no company at the IPO stage adopted a charter provision prohibiting itself from adopting takeover defenses in the future).
297
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 1174-75 (arguing that any strategy
that discourages tender offers reduces welfare to both shareholders and society); see
also Schwartz, supra note 71, at 230 (summarizing Easterbrook and Fischel’s argument
that auctions are inefficient).
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potential acquisition targets for their firm) would do so as well, but
state-level control does not provide any mechanism that would allow
for such a bargain. This suggests that, even if there is a race to the
top, such a race will not produce socially optimal laws.
This result potentially offers some support for nationalizing corporate law. Given the choice between all firms having poison pills and
no firms having poison pills, diversified shareholders would have incentives to choose socially optimal laws. Thus, one might expect that
the imposition of a uniform rule would eliminate the poison pill, or at
least reduce its potency. On the other hand, nationalizing corporate
law would remove the interstate competitive pressures that currently
shape corporate law and which may be expected to produce socially
optimal laws in those instances in which shareholders’ interests mirror
those of society. In addition, many countries with nationalized corporate law insulate corporations from takeover attempts to a greater de298
Thus, state-level control of corgree than U.S. states generally do.
porate law may well be the best practical option, even though it falls
299
short of the ideal regulatory scheme.
2. Variation in Corporate Takeover Defense Levels
The question of why public firms display a variety of different levels
300
of takeover defenses has been disputed for some time.
As the conventional argument holds that either a race to the top or a race to the
bottom would produce uniformity in defense levels, our models pro301
vide one mechanism for resolving what some have seen as a paradox.
The models imply that public firms choose varying levels of takeover defenses based on complicated interactions between multiple pa298

Cf. William D. Schneper & Mauro F. Guillén, Stakeholder Rights and Corporate
Governance: A Cross-National Study of Hostile Takeovers, 49 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 263, 263-64
(2004) (providing statistics showing that many more takeovers were announced in the
United States than in other countries).
299
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 71, at 222 (arguing that competition
among states, even if imperfect, creates a powerful tendency for states to enact laws that
benefit investors); ROMANO, supra note 77, at 75 (“Acknowledging that the track record
of most states in takeover regulation raises serious questions concerning the efficacy of
state competition does not imply that national regulation of takeovers is the solution to
an imperfect federal system.”); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal
Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 973-74 (2001) (concluding that while
state control is “imperfect,” it is still preferable to federal intervention).
300
See Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 88-89 (discussing competing theoretical views on the matter).
301
Cf. Coates, supra note 120, at 1308 (arguing that the variation in defense levels
is attributable to differences in legal counsel).

BARRY & HATFIELD REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

694

2/15/2012 7:17 PM

[Vol. 160: 633

302

rameters.
Both these parameters themselves and the Target’s level
of takeover defenses affect the likelihood of a takeover and the pre303
mium that the Shareholders expect to receive in such an event. Accordingly, studies that consider the effects of different takeover defenses would be likely to reach conflicting and confusing results bebecause their effects would vary depending on the qualities of the
Target. Indeed, the empirical literature on this issue is complex and
304
Both studies that have looked for connections becontradictory.
305
tween particular firm characteristics and defense levels and those
306
that have examined the effects of defense levels on premiums have
307
yielded mixed and inconsistent results.
Studies examining the effects of adopting takeover defenses on a target’s stock price have been
308
similarly patchy; even in those that have found significant price reac309
tions, the price effects on individual firms have varied widely. These
models offer a potential explanation for these varied results.
More specifically, the models predict that corporations with the
highest expected Synergies should be the most likely to have effective
staggered boards. These companies likely include highly technologyintensive companies and companies with nontraditional businesses.
There is some recent empirical evidence that supports this prediction.
For example, companies that are backed by venture capital funds are
more likely to possess these qualities than the average publicly traded
company. Such companies also have a higher incidence of takeover
defenses at the time of their initial public offering than other corpora310
Defenses also appear more frequently among firms in intions do.
dustries where takeovers are more common and in which managerial
performance is easier to observe, and were not correlated with a proxy
311
for high managerial private benefits. These firms correspond to po302

See supra subsection II.E.2; infra Appendix.
See supra Sections II.C-E; infra Appendix.
304
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
305
See sources cited supra note 84.
306
See sources cited supra note 86.
307
See Coates, supra note 6, at 291-97, 306-10, 328-36 (providing evidence that pill
adoptions do not affect bids, that poison pills do not correlate with other firm traits,
and that certain other antitakeover measures have not been shown to affect bids).
308
See id. at 318 (“Some [studies] show positive price reactions, some negative; but
mixed or insignificant results predominate . . . . [Even significant] results are not robust . . . .”); sources cited supra note 87.
309
See Coates, supra note 6, at 318-19 (“Even in studies showing negative results,
positive price reactions are observed in forty to fifty percent of the sample . . . .”).
310
Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 96 tbl.2.
311
Id. at 103-04, 108-10.
303
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tential Targets that are likely to have high Synergy and that are likely to
312
have Insiders with low Private Benefits. Another study has found that
staggered boards increase value when firms have higher advisory needs
(i.e., firms that are large and complex) and low monitoring costs (i.e.,
313
firms in which it is easier to observe managerial performance). Such
firms seem somewhat more likely than their peers to have large poten314
tial Synergies and to have Insiders with low Private Benefits.
3. Post–Takeover Attempt Performance
The models presented in this Article can be used to make predictions with respect to the future performance of the Acquirer and Target
after a takeover attempt. The models are predicated on the assumption
that the Acquirer is a self-interested, rational actor. Consequently, they
predict that the Acquirer should realize positive expected returns from
315
successful takeovers under all levels of defenses. However, empirical
studies have generally found that acquirers’ returns from takeovers are
316
either indistinguishable from zero or slightly negative. While these
studies typically do not distinguish between takeover attempts involving only one acquirer and attempts involving several, these findings
still suggest that some degree of hubris or “winner’s curse,” which the
312

But see Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 102 (rejecting the hypothesis that
defenses are adopted to create bargaining power).
313
Ahn et al., supra note 84, at 36.
314
On the other hand, the measure of monitoring costs is positively correlated
with research and development and with the relative value of intangible assets, both of
which might be correlated with large synergy. Id. at 6.
315
See supra Sections II.B-D. If a rational Acquirer received negative returns from
takeovers, it would not pursue them. Assuming that the Shareholders choose the Target’s level of defenses, it is difficult to predict the Acquirer’s relative returns across acquisitions involving different levels of defenses because Targets choosing each level of
defenses will have different features. See supra subsection II.E.2.
316
See, e.g., Babu G. Baradwaj et al., Bidder Returns in Interstate and Intrastate Bank
Acquisitions, 5 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 261, 266-67 (1992) (finding negative returns); David E. Bellamy & Walter M. Lewin, Corporate Takeovers, Method of Payment, and Bidding
Firms’ Shareholder Returns: Australian Evidence, 9 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 137, 146 (1992)
(finding small positive returns for cash deals and negative returns for share exchange
offers in Australian takeovers); Robert F. Bruner, Does M&A Pay? A Survey of Evidence
for the Decision-Maker, J. APPLIED FIN., Spring–Summer 2002, at 48, 56 (synthesizing data
from studies from 1971 to 2001 and finding zero returns); Sylvia C. Hudgins & Bruce
Seifert, Stockholder Returns and International Acquisitions of Financial Firms: An Emphasis
on Banking, 10 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 163, 177 (1996) (finding zero returns); Jensen &
Ruback, supra note 19, at 16 (reviewing the merger literature and finding returns near
zero); Elias Raad & H.K. Wu, Acquiring Firms’ Stock Returns: Methods of Payment, Change
in Leverage, and Management Ownership, 18 J. ECON. & FIN. 13, 25 (1994) (finding positive returns from cash mergers and negative returns from stock-financed mergers).
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models in this Article do not capture, may play an important role in
317
acquirer behavior. Nonetheless, studies that examine the joint benefits of an acquisition to acquirers and target shareholders consistently
318
find that takeovers offer significant positive returns. Accordingly, all
of the models’ predictions with respect to the social welfare effects of
various defenses remain applicable.
Similarly, the models all assume that the Shareholders are profitdriven rational actors. Recall that, in the Poison Pill Without ESB
model, the Shareholders will sometimes reject the Acquirer’s offer by
voting against it in a proxy fight based on their beliefs about the Actual Target Value. If the Shareholders are, in fact, profit-driven rational
actors, the market value of the Target should, on average, rise above
the amount of the Acquirer’s rejected offer within a relatively short
319
This happens at times in individual cases, but the
period of time.
authors of this Article have not been able to locate a study that has
considered whether a rise in market value following shareholder rejection happens systematically. Studies have shown that the stock
prices of targets that reject a takeover offer do not, on average, climb
320
Howabove the offered price within a reasonable amount of time.
ever, these results are entirely consistent with the models’ predictions
321
when the Insiders control whether the offer is accepted.

317

See, e.g., Nikhil P. Varaiya & Kenneth R. Ferris, Overpaying in Corporate Takeovers:
The Winner’s Curse, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 1987, at 64, 64-65 (1987) (explaining
the winner’s curse phenomenon that affects competitive takeovers and arguing that
bidders discount their bids to account for the phenomenon).
318
See, e.g., Bruner, supra note 316, at 51-56 (analyzing three decades’ worth of
merger studies and finding that takeovers result in a positive economic gain); Devos et
al., supra note 144, at 1192 (finding joint gains of ten percent in mergers of large industrial firms); Houston et al., supra note 144, at 303-05 (finding joint gains in bank
mergers); Hudgins & Seifert, supra note 316, at 177 (finding that targets receive abnormal benefits while acquirers roughly break even); Jensen & Ruback, supra note 19,
at 22 (“[T]argets gain and bidders do not appear to lose . . . .”).
319
If, on average, this does not occur, rational and self-interested Shareholders
would improve their utility by accepting the Acquirer’s offer in all such situations.
320
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277, 283, 289-92 (1984) (citing findings showing that successful defenses result in losses for target shareholders); Gilson, A Structural Approach to
Corporations, supra note 72, at 857-58 (showing that, on average, the shareholders of
targets that rejected offers received an approximately five percent lower rate of return
than they would have realized if the offers had been accepted).
321
See supra Sections II.C-D.
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4. Optimal Level of Private Benefits
These models also have a surprising implication with respect to
the level of Insiders’ Private Benefits that is optimal for the Shareholders. The Insiders’ Private Benefits are what make their interests
diverge from those of the Shareholders, and it is these divergences
that create the socially inefficient agency costs that corporate law tries
322
to eliminate.
Accordingly, conventional wisdom suggests that the
Shareholders’ utility is maximized when there are no Private Benefits
323
and decreases monotonically as Private Benefits increase.
The models presented herein contradict this conventional wisdom, however. In general, these models predict that the level of Insiders’ Private Benefits that maximizes Shareholder utility is non324
zero. The reason for this divergence from the conventional wisdom
is that, as discussed earlier, the Insiders’ Private Benefits can function
325
Thus, our models
as a commitment device for the Shareholders.
suggest that Shareholders should not be expected to police Insiders
perfectly, even if they had the ability to do so.
B. Relaxing Simplifying Assumptions
The models presented in this paper incorporate several simplify326
ing assumptions to emphasize conceptual points.
While relaxing
some of these assumptions reduces the models’ predictive power,
their validity is not predicated on any of these assumptions. In fact,
relaxing certain of these assumptions actually strengthens some of the
models’ predictions.
1. Parameter Independence
The models presented in this Article do not require that there be
any direct links between the Target’s level of takeover defenses, the
Insiders’ Private Benefits, the distribution of possible Actual Target
Values, and the Synergy. These assumptions simplify and, in some
322

See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 207 (explaining that the separation of ownership and control will sometimes result in some form of self-dealing by directors and that
“corporate law is best understood as a mechanism for constraining [self-dealing]”); see
also supra Section II.A.
323
Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 1175 (arguing that any defenses reduce overall shareholder welfare).
324
See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 6.
325
See supra Section II.E.1.
326
See supra Section II.A.
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ways, generalize the models. In reality, however, a number of relationships might plausibly exist between these items.
For example, it seems likely that an increase in Private Benefits
would have a negative effect on a corporation’s value. High levels of
Private Benefits likely correspond to the Insiders shirking responsibilities or receiving lavish perks, both of which would reduce the corporation’s value (i.e., the Actual Target Value). Similarly, the more the Insiders shirk their responsibilities or line their own pockets, the more
the Acquirer may stand to gain (in the form of Synergy) from taking
327
over the Target and installing better management.
On the other
hand, if the Insiders shirk their responsibilities, they may be less likely
to endow the Target with other qualities that create Synergy (e.g., new
328
Therefore, the effect of
technologies, access to new markets, etc.).
Private Benefits on Synergy seems uncertain. Additionally, the Actual
329
Target Value may affect the Synergy. For example, a new technology could be twice as valuable to a particular acquirer as to anyone else.
However, none of these relationships directly affects the analysis
of the No Poison Pill, Poison Pill with ESB, or Poison Pill Without ESB
models. In each, the parameters are fixed throughout the time period at issue, and all parameters except the Actual Target Value are ob330
servable.
Therefore, there is no theoretical problem with treating
each of these variables as being determined independently and simply
327

See Larry H.P. Lang et al., Managerial Performance, Tobin’s Q, and the Gains from
Successful Tender Offers, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 137, 152 (1989) (concluding that targets with
poor-quality management achieve greater premiums when purchased by high-quality
acquirers); Henri Servaes, Tobin’s Q and the Gains from Takeovers, 66 J. FIN. 409, 418
(1991) (same).
328
See Harry Henderson & Alan Gart, Key Variables Explaining Acquisition Premiums for
Large Commercial Banks, BANK ACCT. & FIN., Summer 1999, at 29, 31 (finding that targets
with higher returns on assets receive higher book-value premiums); Peter S. Rose, The
Impact of Mergers in Banking: Evidence from a Nationwide Sample of Federally Chartered Banks,
39 J. ECON. & BUS. 289, 291 (1987) (contending that targets achieving a higher rate of
return on their common equity and greater operating efficiency than their acquirers in
the pre-takeover announcement period receive higher premiums); Hany A. Shawky et al.,
Determinants of Bank Merger Premiums, J. ECON. & FIN., Spring 1996, at 117, 126 (finding
that targets with a high return on assets receive higher premiums).
329
If the Actual Target Value positively affects the Synergy, this will exacerbate the
adverse-selection problem that the Acquirer faces in the Poison Pill Without ESB and
Poison Pill with ESB models. This makes the Shareholder-Oriented Offer more attractive to the Acquirer, as it overcomes the exacerbated adverse-selection problem. There
are similar implications when the Target has a poison pill and an effective staggered
board.
330
It is not problematic that the Actual Target Value is not directly observable; its
value cannot affect any other parameter, because all other parameters are already
fixed and observable to all parties.

BARRY & HATFIELD REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

Pills and Partisans

2/15/2012 7:17 PM

699

noting that it is likely that when Private Benefits are high that the Actual Target Value may be low, and the Synergy may be either high or
low. Thus, the models’ assumption that these relationships do not exist is not problematic.
2. Invariable and Observable Parameters
The logic above does not apply if the parameters are not fixed and
observable. If either of these requirements is not satisfied, parameter
interdependence becomes more of a concern. It is instructive to consider each requirement separately.
If the parameters are not fixed throughout the period being analyzed, then changing one of the parameters could affect the others.
There are several ways in which this could have an impact on the unintegrated models presented in Sections II.B-D—the Actual Target
Value and the Synergy likely fluctuate with changing economic condi331
tions, and the Insiders’ Private Benefits may also —but this issue is
most likely to affect the integrated models analyzed in Section II.E.
Since adopting an effective staggered board makes a corporation
332
less susceptible to a takeover, it seems plausible that the reduced
disciplining effect of the market for corporate control will cause the
333
Insiders to shirk their responsibilities and increase their perks. This
would increase their Private Benefits, which could affect the other parameters through the mechanisms discussed above. Thus, a corporation’s choice of its level of takeover defenses would not simply depend
upon the parameters specified in the model; the level of takeover de331

For example, the Insiders may be more supportive of a takeover if economic
conditions are favorable and thus conducive to them finding comparable employment
if they lose their jobs after a takeover. The Insiders’ preferences may also fluctuate
with personal events in their lives.
332
See Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 928-29 (discussing how an effective staggered board can give a target substantial time to remain independent and explaining
that no attempt to take control of the board of directors of a target with an effective
staggered board has been successful).
333
See Pornsit Jiraporn & Yixin Liu, Capital Structure, Staggered Boards, and Firm Value, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 49, 53-54 (showing that firms with staggered
boards tend to choose debt structures that favor management interests over shareholders’); Klausner, supra note 84, at 762 (arguing that management compensation
tends to rise more at firms with effective staggered boards than at comparable firms
without such boards). On the other hand, without defenses, Insiders may change their
behavior in ways that may reduce firm value. Cf. Stout, supra note 2, at 856-61 (arguing
that insiders at companies without staggered boards may engage in other behaviors to
discourage takeovers and that these behaviors may be more costly to shareholders than
existing defenses).
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fenses chosen would also affect those parameters. Comparing the implications for each of the parties of different levels of takeover defenses
would become more difficult, but the net effect would be to make the
Shareholders less favorably inclined toward takeover defenses and the
Insiders more so, which would reinforce the analyses of subsections
II.E.1 and II.E.2.
If some parameters are related, but are not precisely observable,
any new information that the parties receive about one parameter also
gives them new information about others, which may in turn provide
334
new information about yet others. This concern is particularly
trenchant because several of the parameters utilized by each model
are unlikely to be directly observable.
This is likely to have the largest effect on the Poison Pill Without
ESB model. If the Insiders do not directly observe the Actual Target
Value and the Shareholders do not directly observe the Insiders’ Private Benefits, this will reduce (but not eliminate) the Shareholders’
ability to draw inferences about the Actual Target Value from the In335
siders’ actions, which itself will affect the bids that the Acquirer is
336
likely to make.
The parties’ inability to directly observe several of the parameters
increases the uncertainty under which the parties interact. This likely
operates to decrease the models’ predictive power. However, it does
not seem to change the qualitative nature of their predictions. For example, in the Poison Pill Without ESB model, the Acquirer should still
334

See Coates, supra note 6, at 297-306 (discussing how instituting a poison pill
sends varied and complicated signals that have different implications for firm value);
Sudip Datta & Mai Iskandar-Datta, Takeover Defenses and Wealth Effects on Securityholders:
The Case of Poison Pill Adoptions, 20 J. BANKING & FIN. 1231, 1248-49 (1996) (concluding
that the value of a company’s bonds drops when it adopts a poison pill, but not the
value of its equity, largely because of what that action signals about the firm’s management, plans, and prospects); Strong & Meyer, supra note 86, at 82-84 (discussing
the signaling effects of poison pills).
335
Mathematically, the equations become somewhat complex because the Insiders’ action gives insight into the sum of the Actual Target Value and the Insiders’ Private Benefits and, as discussed above, the Insiders’ Private Benefits likely affect the Actual Target Value.
336
The Acquirer’s optimization problem is even more complex, because it depends upon the Shareholders’ decisionmaking rule. See supra Section II.D. In addition, the instances in which the Shareholders accept the Acquirer’s offer after the Insiders reject it are unlikely to constitute a representative cross section from the
distributions of the Insiders’ Private Benefits and the Actual Target Value. The
amount of the Insiders’ Private Benefits is likely to affect the Actual Target Value, and
both may affect the Synergy. Both the Actual Target Value and the Synergy factor directly into the Acquirer’s utility function. See supra Section II.A.
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have two possible optimal strategies: one directed toward the Insiders
and one directed toward the Shareholders. In short, real-world interactions are likely to be significantly messier than these simplified models.
3. Uniform Distribution
All of the models analyzed in this Article adopt the simplifying assumption that the Actual Target Value is drawn from a uniform distribution. However, sophisticated financial analyses are far more likely
337
to model a public company’s value using a lognormal distribution.
A detailed discussion of the properties of the lognormal distribu338
tion is beyond the scope of this Article. For our purposes, it suffices
to say that the relative frequency of values close to the mean is generally higher for a lognormal distribution than for a uniform distribution. Similarly, above a certain point, the lognormal distribution tapers off relatively rapidly. This likely makes the Insiders’ private
information less valuable and the adverse-selection problem that the
Acquirer faces less important. It also suggests that, in many instances,
the Insider-Oriented Offer’s probability of success will be more extreme (i.e., closer to zero or one) than it would be if the Actual Target
Values were uniformly distributed.
Similarly, the ShareholderOriented Offer—the smallest Price at which the Shareholders will
override the Insiders and vote in favor of a takeover—is likely to be
smaller, because extremely high Actual Target Values are relatively
339
In sum, the models’ predictive power is likely to deless frequent.
crease, but the predictions seem unlikely to change qualitatively.
4. Zero Transaction Costs
An obvious difference between the models presented here and
the real world is the absence of transaction costs. In the models, the
only cost the Acquirer incurs is the Price of a takeover, if there is
337

See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
A continuous random variable follows a lognormal distribution if the natural
logarithm of that variable follows a normal distribution. Kunio Shimizu & Edwin L.
Crow, History, Genesis, and Properties, in LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 1, 1 (Edwin L. Crow & Kunio Shimizu eds., 1988). A lognormal distribution is often used when a random variable is the product of many positive independent
random variables. Financial returns over successive periods are often assumed to be
independently distributed random variables.
339
This is because the relative probability of high-value outliers in the Actual Target Value in the lognormal distribution is likely (but not always) smaller than in a uniform distribution. This makes the Shareholders more likely to accept a lower offer.
338
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340

one. Meanwhile, the Target, the Insiders, and the Shareholders in341
cur no costs whatsoever in connection with the possible takeover.
In reality, this is not the case. Acquirers and targets spend mil342
lions pursuing and resisting takeover attempts.
They retain law
firms, accounting firms, investment banks, and other expensive advi343
sors. They incur many of these costs regardless of whether the take344
over attempt ultimately succeeds. In addition, takeover attempts absorb a great deal of the time and energy of executives on both sides of
345
the transaction, which also entails costs, including opportunity costs.
Takeover costs are likely to increase with the level of the Target’s
346
takeover defenses.
The effects of these costs are twofold. First, they reduce Acquirers’
willingness to make bids, particularly bids with a low probability of suc347
cess.
Second, by reducing the gains to the Target, they reduce the
340

See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.A.
342
See, e.g., Mark Scott, BHP Billiton Ends Rio Tinto Takeover Battle, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/europe
insight/archives/2008/11/bhp_billiton_ends_rio_tinto_takeover_battle.html (noting that
BHP Billiton spent over $450 million in its failed takeover attempt of rival mining
company Rio Tinto).
343
See, e.g., David Lat, When $1,000 an Hour Is Not Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007,
at 6 (discussing the use of “premium billing,” the charging of a premium over hourly
billings, by law firms specializing in mergers and acquisitions). The costs of takeovers
are significant enough that they have attracted the attention of the IRS. See INDOPCO,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 88-90 (1992) (holding that expenses incurred in a friendly
takeover, such as legal and investment banking fees, are not deductible as “ordinary
and necessary” business expenses); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2005-21-032 (Feb. 11, 2005)
(ruling that expenses incurred to terminate a merger so that a corporation could enter
into a different merger could not be deducted as “ordinary and necessary” business
expenses); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (Mar. 27, 1989) (determining that expenses incurred in procuring a white knight to defend against a hostile takeover could
be deducted as “ordinary and necessary” business expenses), vacated, I.R.S. Tech. Adv.
Mem. 89-45-003 (Aug. 1, 1989).
344
See supra note 342.
345
See Subramanian, supra note 3, at 646 (explaining that “acquisitions generally
require substantial managerial time and effort” and that “managerial attention can only be focused on one acquisition at a time”).
346
See id. at 655-59.
347
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 6-7 (arguing that the inability of acquirers to appropriate the full value of costs incurred when searching for potential targets will lead to a reduction in the number of tender offers); Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 71, at 1178-79 (explaining that information costs incurred by acquirers to
research targets may reduce the number of tender offers). Takeover costs may also
cause Acquirers to make either higher or lower bids than they would otherwise; the
increased relative cost of a failed bid favors higher bids, but the reduced gains from a
successful takeover favor lower bids.
341
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Shareholders’ net benefits from takeovers and takeover defenses, while
increasing the Insiders’ aversion to takeovers and their affinity for takeover defenses. This causes the Shareholders to prefer a lower level of
takeover defenses, and the Insiders to prefer a higher level of defenses,
than each would in the absence of transaction costs. This would reinforce the analyses of subsections II.E.1 and II.E.2 with respect to Shareholders’ and Insiders’ relative preferences regarding takeover defense
levels. But, while the absolute size of transaction costs is substantial,
their relative size compared to the value of the publicly traded Target is
348
likely to be fairly insignificant in many instances. Thus, the effects of
349
transaction costs may be minimal at best.
5. Shareholder Uniformity
The models treat the Shareholders as a unified whole, with solely
profit-oriented incentives. Both of these assumptions are potentially
problematic.
First, certain Shareholders may hold Target shares for reasons
other than profit. For example, an employee benefit plan may hold
Target shares, and it may oppose a takeover anticipated to result in
350
layoffs. If the Target is in a “green” business, environmentalists may
351
purchase its stock partly to support its efforts. To the extent that the
Shareholders are not profit-driven and oppose a takeover, this Article’s models will not be good predictors of the Shareholders’ or the
Acquirer’s behavior. However, this concern is unlikely to apply to
most takeovers, since most shares in U.S. public corporations are
owned by investors whose primary motivation is profit.
Second, even strictly profit-driven Shareholders are not a homogenous group, but rather an amalgamation of separate actors with different valuations of the Target. As the Shareholders have all chosen to use
their scarce investment dollars to purchase and hold Target shares,
348

See, e.g., Scott, supra note 342 (noting that the price BHP offered for Rio Tinto
fluctuated between $150 billion and $62 billion during its takeover attempt, which implies that the $450 million in costs that BHP incurred in its attempt constituted, at
most, between 0.3% and 0.7% of the amount of the necessary bid).
349
Cf. supra note 59 (citing research finding that poison pills have little to no effect on the likelihood of a takeover occurring).
350
See E. Richard Brownlee II & Robert F. Bruner, The Leveraged ESOP as a Takeover
Defense: The Case of Polaroid Corporation, 1 J. M&A ANALYSIS 3, 7-15 (1990) (giving an example of a firm that arguably beat back a takeover attempt through the use of an employee benefit plan).
351
See, e.g., GREEN CHIP STOCKS, http://www.greenchipstocks.com (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011) (tracking investment opportunities in the alternative-energy sector).
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the mean of their valuations is likely higher than the general public’s
352
estimate of the Actual Target Value.
Thus, in order to convince a majority of Shareholders to sell their
Target shares, the Acquirer would have to offer a Price that is significantly above the Initial Trading Price. This would lead to higher
premiums from tender offers in the absence of a poison pill than the
No Poison Pill model predicts. Average takeover premiums from tender offers before the growth of the poison pill were significantly above
353
this level.
However, the net effect of the Shareholders being a non-uniform
group with diverse beliefs as to the Target’s value generally does not
change the underlying dynamics of this Article’s models. This effect
applies across all of the models to raise the Price that the Acquirer
must offer in any bid targeted toward the Shareholders. This reduces,
but does not eliminate, the gap between such a bid and one targeted
at the Insiders.
CONCLUSION
This Article attempts to fill an important gap in the academic literature on takeover defenses by introducing formal models of several
different target defense levels that incorporate target insiders’ private
information and imperfect incentives. Through analysis of these
models, this Article offers new insight into the forces that drive the
adoption of takeover defenses and provides additional perspectives on
confusing and conflicting empirical findings.
These models suggest that a corporation’s optimal level of defenses
depends on several factors, and that variations in these factors may
explain the diverse levels of takeover defenses observed in practice. In
general, corporations for which an acquirer is likely to pay the highest
premiums are likely to implement stronger takeover defenses. And,
while corporate insiders generally prefer a higher level of defenses
than shareholders do, shareholders do not prefer the lowest level of
defenses and insiders do not always prefer the highest. The level of
352

Though, of course, some may continue to hold their stock for tax purposes or
other reasons, and not because of a belief that Target is undervalued.
353
See Douglas V. Austin, The Financial Management of Tender Offer Takeovers, FIN.
MGMT., Spring 1974, at 37, 40 (finding premiums between five and thirty-five percent
in most tender offers made from 1968 to 1972). Since many tender offers are only operative if a majority of outstanding shares are tendered, shareholders with higher valuations of a target implicitly function as somewhat of a commitment device for those
with lower valuations. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
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takeover defenses preferred by each varies depending upon the circumstances. Therefore, the diversity of defense levels that corporations exhibit poses no challenge either to theories that shareholders
control choices of defense levels or to theories that managers control
such choices.
The models also suggest that modern defenses enable target shareholders to extract value from acquirers by empowering corporate insiders. Even though the insiders are unfaithful agents, their informational
advantage and higher reservation price can ultimately redound to the
shareholders’ benefit. However, this benefit to shareholders does not
benefit society. This result has implications for the optimal degree of
federal involvement in corporate law, as a race to the top by states to
serve shareholder interests would still not create socially optimal corporate laws. Further research is necessary to assess the degree to which
these models accurately reflect real-world behavior and to measure the
relative importance of the forces captured in these models compared to
other phenomena.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we formally state our models and prove the results stated in the text.
A. The Models
The models are composed of three agents: the Shareholders, the
Acquirer, and the Insiders.
The value of the target firm (the “Target”) is v, which is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F with a smooth
partial distribution function f on [vmin, vmax]. Let v̄ be the mean of the
distribution. The true value of the Target v is known by the Insiders
but is not known by the Shareholders or the Acquirer.
If the Target is bought at a price p, then the Acquirer receives v + s
– p, where s ≥ 0 is the Synergy that the Acquirer has with the Target and
p is the price paid; otherwise the Acquirer receives 0. If the Target is
bought, the Shareholders obtain p, and receive v otherwise. Finally, the
Insiders, whose Private Benefits are represented by b, obtain p – b
when the Target is sold and v when the Target is not sold. We assume
that b > 0. That is, the Insiders strictly prefer not to sell the Target
when the price offered is equal to the value of the Target.
We consider three models in the subsections below. The solution
concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We refer to an equilibrium that is unique, except over a set of realizations of the random variable v with a measure of zero, as a generically unique subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. We also make several statements that describe how a
set changes in response to a parameter. In this case, a set A(t) is weakly
increasing in t if min A(t) ≤ min A(t') and max A(t) ≤ max A(t') for all
t < t'.
1. The No Poison Pill Model
In this model, the game proceeds as follows:
1. The Acquirer makes an offer p.
2. The Shareholders decide to accept or reject.
3. Payoffs are realized.
It is clear that in the second stage the Shareholders strictly prefer to
sell for any p > v̄, strictly prefer not to sell for any p < v̄, and are indifferent at p = v̄. Hence, we have the following result:
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Proposition 1. The unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
No Poison Pill game is for the Acquirer to offer v̄ to the Shareholders
and for the Shareholders to accept.
2. The Poison Pill with an Effective Staggered Board Model
In this model, the game proceeds as follows:
1. The Acquirer makes an offer p.
2. The Insiders decide to accept or reject.
3. Payoffs are realized.
It is clear that in the second stage the Insiders will strictly prefer to
sell for any p – b > v and will strictly prefer not to sell for any p – b < v.
Hence, the problem of the Acquirer in the first stage is to solve
argmax
min

.
min

Proposition 2. In any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the poison
pill and effective staggered board game, the Acquirer offers p* P*
and the Insiders accept if p* > v + b and reject if p* < v + b.
Proposition 3. If s > b, then every p* P* is interior to [vmin + b, ∞), and
the set of optimal offers are solutions to
(s – b)f(p* – b) – F(p* – b) = 0.
If furthermore f is a weakly decreasing function on its domain, then
there is a unique solution to the above equation and a generically
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
The proposition follows from the second-order condition of the
Acquirer’s problem, that (s – b)f'(p – b) – f(p) ≤ 0, which holds for all p
if f is a weakly decreasing function. Furthermore, if s > b, then b + vmin is
clearly nonoptimal, as it provides exactly zero utility in expectation,
whereas b + vmin + (s/2) provides strictly positive utility in expectation.
For a uniform distribution, for example, the optimal offer is s + vmin if s
≥ b. For an exponential distribution with parameter λ, we have that f(v)
- v
= λe λ on [0, ∞], and so the optimal offer by the Acquirer is given by
(s – b)λe λ
– (1 – e λ
)=0
-λ(p* – b) = ln(1/(λ(s – b) + 1))
p* = (1/λ)ln(λ(s – b) + 1) + b
- (p* - b)

if s ≥ b.

- (p* - b)
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Given the first-order condition in the above proposition, it is easy
to show two properties of the solution. First, since
0
min

we have by Topkis’s theorem the following results.
Proposition 4. In the poison pill and effective staggered board game,
the set of the Acquirer’s optimal offers P* is weakly increasing in the
Synergy s.
Further, if s < b, then the first-order condition is always negative, and
so we have the following.
Proposition 5. In the poison pill and effective staggered board game, if
s < b, it is optimal for the Acquirer to make an offer that will never be
accepted.
Finally, we can take the cross-partial with respect to b and p to obtain
′
min

which is nonnegative if f is decreasing and s > b, and so (again by
Topkis’s theorem) in this case the optimal offer will be increasing with b.
Proposition 6. In the poison pill and effective staggered board game, if
f is a weakly decreasing function and s > b, then the unique optimal
offer p* by the Acquirer is weakly increasing in the private benefits b.
We also have that, from the perspective of the Shareholders, the
optimal value of b may be nonzero. This is because b has two effects.
First, for a fixed price offering, a larger b increases the range of Target
values for which the Insiders choose to not sell the Target even though
the Shareholders would wish for them to do so. However, as shown
above, a larger b may also cause the Acquirer to offer a higher price.
-v
Consider the case when f(v) = e on [0, ∞]. Then, from the calculations above, the Acquirer’s optimal offer is given by p* = ln(1 + s – b)
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+ b. Hence, for a given Synergy s, the payoff to the Shareholders is
given by
∞

ln 1

.

At b = 0, the derivative of this expression is positive with respect to b,
which shows that, from the perspective of the Shareholders, the optimal private benefits are higher than zero. Indeed, one can solve for
the optimal benefits from the perspective of the Shareholders, and
obtain
1

2

√1
2

4

0.

3. The Poison Pill Without an Effective Staggered Board Model
In this model, the game proceeds as follows:
1. The Acquirer makes an offer p.
2. The Insiders choose to accept or reject.
3. If the Insiders reject, the Shareholders choose whether
or not to overrule the Insiders and accept the offer.
4. Payoffs are realized.
Let us first consider the subgame after the Acquirer has offered p.
Note that, for the Insiders, it is a weakly dominant strategy to accept
any offer p > v + b and reject any offer p < v + b. If the Insiders employ
such a strategy, then it is strictly optimal for the Shareholders to reject
whenever the Insiders reject and ~
v (p) > p, where ~
v (p) is the expected
value of the Target, conditional upon the Insiders playing a weakly
dominant strategy and rejecting the Acquirer’s offer of p, given by

1

.

Thus, if ~
v (p) > p, the generically unique weakly undominated Nash
equilibrium of the subgame is for the Insiders to reject the offer if p <
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v + b, and to accept it otherwise, and for the Shareholders to support
their decision.
Consider p̂ defined by
̂

min

0, ∞ :

.

At this price, even if the Insiders suggest rejection, the expected value
of the Target is weakly less than the offered price. Hence, in any
weakly undominated subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the Shareholders will overrule the Insiders and accept the offer.
The existence of a price p̂ at which the Shareholders will always
accept the offer means that the Acquirer can now offer the price p̂ and
obtain the Target with certainty. Hence, the Acquirer will either offer
a price p* P* and obtain the Target only if the Insiders agree, or the
price p̂ and obtain the Target for sure.
Proposition 7. In any weakly undominated subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the poison pill with no effective staggered board game, the
Acquirer either
 offers the price p̂ , which is then accepted by the Shareholders if
rejected by the Insiders, or
 offers p* P*, which the Insiders accept if p* > v + b and reject
if p* < v + b, with the Shareholders supporting the decision of
the Insiders. In this case, p* < p̂ .
We will call the Acquirer strategy elucidated in the first bullet
point the Shareholder-Oriented strategy and the Acquirer strategy
elucidated in the second bullet point the Insider-Oriented strategy.
It follows from this proposition that an increase in Synergy can only increase the price p that the Acquirer offers for the Target. Clearly,
as Synergy increases, if the Shareholders and the Insiders continue to
use the same strategies, the price offered by the Acquirer will either
stay the same or increase (as in Proposition 3). Since p* < p̂ , if the
Acquirer switches from the Insider-Oriented strategy to the Shareholder-Oriented strategy, the price will also increase. Finally, it is clear
that the Acquirer will never switch from the Shareholder-Oriented
strategy to the Insider-Oriented strategy as s increases. This is because
the value the Acquirer obtains from employing the ShareholderOriented strategy increases one-to-one with the Synergy, but only increases at the rate F(p* – b) with respect to the Insider-Oriented strat-
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egy. To see this, note that the Insider-Oriented strategy gives the Acquirer expected value equal to

and so, by the envelope theorem, the derivative of this with respect to
s is simply
1.

Proposition 8. The set of optimal offers by the Acquirer is weakly increasing in the Synergy s. In particular, if the Acquirer chooses the
Shareholder-Oriented strategy for a Synergy level s, it will also choose
the Shareholder-Oriented strategy for any Synergy greater than s.
B. Optimal Level of Takeover Defenses
Shareholder preferences for defense levels depend on parameters. For instance, consider the case where the value of the Target is
uniformly distributed between 250 and 750, and the Private Benefits
are 100. If the Synergy is 300, then the Shareholders prefer not to
have an effective staggered board, as they obtain an expected utility of
650 without an effective staggered board and 580 with an effective
staggered board, while if the Synergy is 500, then the Shareholders
still obtain an expected utility of 650 without the effective staggered
board (as the Acquirer still always buys the Target) but now obtain
740 with the effective staggered board.
However, we can easily characterize some of the instances in
which the Shareholders prefer an effective staggered board. In particular, when s is sufficiently large, the enhanced bargaining power of
the effective staggered board is helpful for the Shareholders.
Proposition 9. There exists an s- such that for all s > s-, the Shareholders
prefer to have an effective staggered board.
The logic of the proposition is straightforward. Suppose that the
Shareholders do prefer an effective staggered board for a given s, and
consider a given s. > s. Then, since the Shareholders strictly prefer the
effective staggered board for the Synergy s, the Acquirer would choose
the Shareholder-Oriented strategy if the Target did not have an effec-
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tive staggered board, and hence would also do so for Synergy s.. Then,
by Proposition 4, we know that if the Target has an effective staggered
board, the Acquirer will make a strictly larger offer when the Synergy
is s. than when it is s. Therefore, we just need to show that the Shareholders prefer larger offers in the poison pill with an effective staggered board game.
The proof is very similar to the intuition. Let the price that the Ac.
quirer offers for Synergy s. be denoted p . If the true value of the Target
.
is such that the Insiders will not sell even at p , the increased Synergy
has no effect on the Shareholders’ utility. If the true value of the Tar.
get is such that the Insiders would sell for either p or p , then the Shareholders are better off as they receive a higher price. Finally, consider
the interval of true Target values for which the Insiders will not sell at
.
the price p, but will sell at price p . For these Target values, for Synergy
.
s the Shareholders receive only v, while for s., they receive p > v + b,
and so the Shareholders are better off in this final scenario as well.
More generally, we can calculate the optimal choice of defenses
from the perspective of the Shareholders. If parameter values are
such that the Acquirer will choose the Insider-Oriented strategy when
there is no effective staggered board, then the existence of an effective staggered board has no effect on Shareholders’ utility. However,
if the Acquirer will choose the Shareholder-oriented strategy when
there is no effective staggered board, then there is a difference in welfare for the Shareholders between the two regimes. In that case, the
Shareholders prefer an effective staggered board if and only if
̂.

Where p* is the offer made by the Acquirer when there is an effective
staggered board. Furthermore, it is clear that if the Shareholders prefer an effective staggered board, then the Insiders do as well, as the
Insiders prefer an effective staggered board if and only if
̂

and so we have the following result:
Proposition 10. If the Shareholders prefer an effective staggered board,
then the Insiders prefer an effective staggered board.
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However, it is not the case that the Insiders always prefer an effective staggered board, as shown in an example in the text in subsection
II.E.1.

